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INTRODUCTION
The problem is in this business that you don’t own your
product. If you record, it’s the record company that owns it; if you
play at a club, it’s the nightclub owners who charge people to
listen to you, and then they tell you your music is not catching
on. . . . This has been my greatest problem—being shortchanged
because I’m a Negro, not because I can’t produce. Here I am
being used as a Negro who can play jazz, and all the people I
recorded for and worked for act as if they own me and my product.
They have been guilty of making me believe I shouldn’t have the
profits from my product simply because they own the channels of
production. . . . They act like I owe them something for letting me
express myself with my music, like the artist is supposed to suffer
and not to live in clean, comfortable situations. . . . The insanity of
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living in America is that ownership is really strength. It’s who
owns who’s strongest in America. . . . That’s why it’s so hard to
lend your music to that kind of existence.
—Ornette Coleman1
The problem that jazz great Ornette Coleman describes in the
above quote from the 1960s reflects a continuing legal problem
that has received scant attention in the academic literature: music
copyright law has done very little to empower or incentivize
musical authors. In fact, its rules have traditionally favored nonauthor intermediaries. Since music was first covered by copyright
in 1831, only composers held ownership rights in their music while
publishers could be assigned a substantial share.2 After the
introduction of the phonograph and radio, record companies
controlled the remainder of rights in composition.3 Sound
recordings, which were not even protected by copyright until
1972,4 are typically assigned contractually to the record label by
the artist.5 And rights in musical performance have always been
secondary, though performance remains the means by which most
musicians are compensated for their talents.6 Thus, Coleman’s
1

A.B. SPELLMAN, FOUR LIVES IN THE BEBOP BUSINESS 129–31 (1966).
See Charles W. Joiner, Analysis, Criticism, Comparison and Suggested Corrections
of the Copyright Law of the United States Relative to Mechanical Reproduction of Music,
2 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 45–47 (1939).
3
Id. at 46–47.
4
See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (2006)).
5
Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 375, 377 (2002).
6
See Music on the Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading? Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 14 (2000) [hereinafter Music on the Internet]
(“In all cases the publicity generated by having recordings available and promoted on
radio, created an audience for my live performances. My performing work is how I make
my living. Even though I’ve recorded over twenty-five records, I cannot support my
family on record royalties alone.” (statement of Roger McGuinn, founder of the Byrds));
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 308–09 (2002) (“For the artist,
free music is a complementary good that increases ticket sales.”); John Perry Barlow, The
Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/
economy.ideas_pr.html (“We [the Grateful Dead] have been letting people tape our
concerts since the early seventies, but instead of reducing the demand for our product, we
are now the largest concert draw in America, a fact that is at least in part attributable to
the popularity generated by those tapes.”); Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle—An Alternate
2
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lament is a historic and contemporary sentiment, whose factual
predicates contradict most of what we understand about the
rationale and substance of copyright law. That understanding may
be a result of failing adequately to consider music copyright from
the music author’s perspective and to see that perspective
embodied in not one but two copyright interests, utility and
personality.
This Article attempts to do both, for the sake of a better
understanding of what the revolution in digital music means for
copyright reform. Radical changes in the production, consumption
and compensation of music and musicians have altered many of
the assumptions on which music copyright ownership is based.
The traditional roles of intermediaries are threatened, while many
more music authors now possess the means to be independent.
From the consumer’s perspective, we are approaching a digital
commons in which music, because of its reduced costs and easy
transferability, is analogized to information.7 Information, goes
the digital age mantra, “wants to be free.”8 As a consequence,
legal scholars have offered a range of copyright law reforms that
seek to balance the often competing interests of artists,
intermediaries, and consumers. Inherent in most of these reform
proposals are assumptions about authorship that revolve around a
need for just compensation. This economic emphasis is consistent
with a century-old trend in copyright jurisprudence. Grounded in a
larger critique about the unchecked expansion of copyright

View, PERFORMING SONGWRITER, May 2002, available at http://www.janisian.com/
article-internet_debacle.html (“Again, from personal experience: in 37 years as a
recording artist, I’ve created 25+ albums for major labels, and I’ve never once received a
royalty check that didn’t show I owed them money. So I make the bulk of my living
from live touring, playing for 80–1500 people a night, doing my own show.”).
7
See Music on the Internet, supra note 6, at 16 (“[Online file-sharing] simply
facilitates communication among people interested in music. It is a return to the original
information-sharing approach of the Internet, and it allows for a depth and a scale of
information that is truly revolutionary.” (statement of Hank Barry, CEO of Napster)).
8
See, e.g., Charles Warner, Information Wants to Be Free, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb.
20, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-warner/information-wants-tobef_b_876
49.html. But see Music on the Internet, supra note 6, at 11 (“‘Information does not want
to be free. Only the transmission of information wants to be free.’” (statement of Lars
Ulrich (quoting Edward Rothstein))).
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ownership,9 it supports the conclusion reached by many reformers
that traditional copyright may no longer be the best protector of
music authors’ rights.
I argue for greater skepticism about the value to authors of a
more limited copyright regime. Critical to the argument are
normative considerations of who music authors should be, what
interests copyright law should protect, and what copyright law
under previous technologies and industry practices has done
historically to compromise the interests of music authors.
American music very quickly replaced the ideal of the Romantic
author with the reality of the non-author copyright owner. At the
same time, copyright doctrine relinquished its emphasis on natural
rights, or rights in authorial personality,10 in favor of a narrower
interest in compensating authors for the utilitarian benefit they
bring the rest of us:11 more music. The utilitarian rationale for
ownership served non-author business intermediaries well, as we
will see, but not musicians. In fact, the move from dual interests,
utility and personality, to a single interest, economic utility,
facilitated systematic harms against authorship that may only be
understood as interests in personality. These are the general harms
to which Ornette Coleman refers as an author but not an owner.
What is an interest in personality? As I discuss in Part II,
personality has its roots in the early copyright notion of the
Romantic author in which a grant of exclusivity for invention was
justified as rewarding the investment of self.12 In this regard,
personality reflects a Hegelian construction of labor.13 But this
9
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
TEX. L. REV. 873, 895–904 (1997); see also White v. Samsung Elec. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). In general, I have no quarrel with
the thrust of this scholarship and have offered my own critique of expansion in the
trademark and publicity rights context. See generally David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of
the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual Property, Commodification and
Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 (2005).
10
See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral
Rights and Copyrights’ Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2001)
[hereinafter Kwall, “Author Stories”].
11
See id.
12
See id. at 19.
13
See Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal
Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1338 (1996).
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elusive idea of personhood in the work is probably more, I argue.
An author’s personality interest is known also by the product of its
loss. That loss is not merely economic—though it may often have
economic implications—but is reflected in the diminished capacity
for control, message, performance and interaction with present and
future audiences. Some legal interests, like the dignitary interest in
torts, are better understood in the negative, by the character of the
harms to them. For copyright’s personality interest we may call
them appropriative harms.
Nowhere are the appropriative harms to personality more
manifest than in the history of black musical authorship in the
United States, and many of those developments are described in
Part III. Black artists have often been the canaries in the copyright
coalmine. The history of appropriative harms I describe is divided
between the genres developed before and during the 1909
Copyright Act14 and those that followed passage of the 1976 Act.15
The first demonstrates how in “soul music”—spirituals, minstrelsy,
jazz, rhythm and blues and rock and roll—black authorship was
expropriated by law and business entities on many levels,
including the fraudulent divestiture of credit and compensation and
through the usurpation of style and mimicry.16 Many of these
common practices directly contradicted or exploited basic
copyright doctrine, such as the originality requirement17 and the
idea/expression dichotomy.18 This treatment, chronicled almost
exclusively by Professor K.J. Greene19 who has likened it to sharecropping, is important also for the creative responses it engendered
from black artists. In almost every instance, we see the tendency
14

Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 93-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810, 1101 (2006)).
16
See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal
Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 372–73 (1999) [hereinafter Greene,
Copyright, Culture & Black Music].
17
See id. at 380.
18
See id. at 349–51.
19
Id. at 349–53; K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the
Debate over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1197
(2008) [hereinafter Greene, “Copynorms”]; see also Keith Aoki, Distributive and
Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion,
Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 722 (2007).
15
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to approach discrimination and appropriation with what might be
called “innovative escape,” ingeniously developing new genres and
styles after being dispossessed of earlier ones.
In Part IV, the history continues through the 1976 Act to show
that many of the practices used against black music authors had
become institutionalized in the record industry, including
assumptions about the value and distribution of rights in copyright
ownership. Ironically, § 106 of the revised Act more explicitly
divides (and makes divisible) the bundle of rights to which
copyright holders are entitled,20 suggesting that different kinds of
infringements—say, of the right of reproduction versus the right of
adaptation—may result in different kinds of harms. Yet all harms
continue to be understood in only economic terms. While
conglomeration occurred among the major record labels in the
1990s,21 technology eventually provided a vehicle for artist
independence, if not resistance, to many common industry norms.
Specifically, in the case of hip-hop music, the rise of entrepreneurs
who both sampled other artists freely (and, for a while, cheaply)
and built their own record companies proved a harbinger of the
independence now commonly seen among music authors and
artists in the digital era.22 Artist independence may indicate as
much about authorial personality as it does freedom from onerous
business terms.
20
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) (“The five fundamental rights that the bill
gives to copyright owners—the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication,
performance, and display—are stated generally in section 106. These exclusive rights,
which comprise the so-called ‘bundle of rights’ that is a copyright, are cumulative and
may overlap in some cases. Each of the five enumerated rights may be subdivided
indefinitely and, as discussed below in connection with section 201, each subdivision of
an exclusive right may be owned and enforced separately.”).
21
See DAVID J. PARK, CONGLOMERATE ROCK: THE MUSIC INDUSTRY’S QUEST TO
DIVIDE MUSIC AND CONQUER WALLETS 24 (2007).
22
See, e.g., Kenneth M. Achenbach, Comment, Grey Area: How Recent Developments
in Digital Music Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of Compulsory
Licensing for Sample-Based Works, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 187, 205–06 (2004) (“For
example, Russell Simmons, the founder and CEO of Phat Fashions 96 and co-founder of
Def Jam Records, began his business career as an undergraduate student at City College
of New York in the mid-1970s when he became the manager of the seminal hip-hop
group Run-DMC. Without the capital he drew from sample-based music, Mr. Simmons
could not have established himself in the music industry and built his multi-million dollar
business empire.”); see also infra notes 312–13, 316–18 and accompanying text.
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The contours of those developments and how they interact with
personality is the subject of Part V. There I review radical changes
in the production and dissemination of recorded music that have
the potential to produce a “pure” system from an artist’s
perspective—that is, one in which control, compensation, and
ownership may remain in the artist. To illustrate a music author’s
perspective on those changes, I use the experience of a real, nowindependent singer-songwriter, Citizen Cope.23 Although Citizen
Cope does not happen to be a black musical author, his experience
as a twenty-first century author and performer is relevant to both
the history of artists under copyright and their future. Finally, I
compare Citizen Cope’s goals and interests to copyright law
reform proposals offered by Raymond Ku, William Fisher, Jessica
Litman, and Lawrence Lessig and reach a somewhat ironic
conclusion. All offer significant improvements to the current
system of copyright as it affects consumers, a robust public domain
and, to a lesser extent, artist compensation. However, I conclude
that, as a result of industry changes wrought by digital technology,
music authors who are protective of personality interests may be
equally content with the status quo.
I. THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT AUTHORSHIP AND
ARTISTIC PERSONALITY
Although early conceptions of copyright justified the grant of
exclusive rights to a Romantic author on natural law and utilitarian
grounds, courts were at least mindful of an underlying interest in
personality that copyright law should protect. The next section
analyzes that philosophical tradition, followed by an examination
of the kind of authorship it privileged. The Part concludes with a
discussion of how more Hegelian notions of personhood were
reflected in early case law, and how, from the perspective of
black—if not most—musicians, such notions are needed now.
Those notions amount to a resuscitation of the author’s personality
interest, defined here primarily by the nature of the harms inflicted
upon it.
23
The reader may find more information about Citizen Cope at Citizen Cope,
www.CitizenCope.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
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A. Labor, Utility and the Economic “Author”
Before purely economic analysis conquered intellectual
property law, the natural law justification for protection began with
the assertion that an author has an inherent right in the fruits of her
labor.24
John Locke’s familiar labor theory of property
modernized the Roman framework, at least in England, and held
that, out of a state of nature where resources are held in common,
individuals convert goods into private property through their
labor.25 Under most interpretations, private property is an
individual’s reward for the value that her labor adds to goods; such
productive activity becomes a benefit to society as a whole.26 The
theory is subject to the proviso that within the commons there are
enough and as good materials to go around, and that one’s
accumulation is conditioned upon not wasting them.27 Whatever
the basis for applying Locke’s theory to the acquisition of physical
property today, there is little doubting its applicability to
intellectual property—provided we agree that the production of
ideas requires labor of some kind.28
Alfred Yen’s study of the early development of copyright law
in England demonstrates how the first copyright act, the Statute of
Anne of 1710, was motivated by both natural law and pure
economic considerations.29 While English courts subsequently
rejected the natural law basis for copyright,30 American
legislatures did not, in some cases explicitly writing both bases
into state statutes between 1783 and 1786.31 These acts are
interesting, as Professor Yen points out, because of the clear link
24
See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 522–24 (1990).
25
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ’g 1980) (1690).
26
Id.
27
Id. § 37.
28
See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 1.03
(2008).
29
See Yen, supra note 24, at 526. Although the statute, entitled “An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning,” secured copyright terms for authors as economic incentives
to publish, it clearly benefited powerful printing interests as well. Id. at 525–26.
30
See id. at 528.
31
Id. at 528–29.
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they make between a concern for rewarding the labor of authorial
genius, on the one hand, and the utilitarian interest in promoting
social welfare through the production of creative works and
inventions, on the other.32 The preamble to Connecticut’s
copyright act, entitled “An Act for the Encouragement of
Literature and Genius,” illustrates the connection:
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the Principles of
natural Equity and Justice, that every Author should
be secured in receiving the Profits that may arise
from the Sale of his Works, and such Security may
encourage Men of Learning and Genius to publish
their Writings; which may do Honour to their
Country, and Service to Mankind.33
Thus, early copyright law enshrined two primary grounds for
legal protection: the economic reward to the author, and the
public’s benefit in artistic innovations. However, the law would
develop subsequently to transform the first into an instrumental
predicate for the second, so that the economic reward to the author
provided the necessary incentive to produce artistic innovations for
the public’s benefit.34

32

See id.
1783 Conn. Pub. Acts 617; see also An Act to Promote Literature, ch. 54, 1786 N.Y.
Laws 99. North Carolina made the link even more explicit:
Whereas Nothing is more strictly a Man’s own than the Fruit of his
Study, and it is proper that Men should be encouraged to pursue
useful Knowledge by the Hope of Reward; and as the Security of
literary Property must greatly tend to encourage Genius, to promote
useful Discoveries and to the general Extension of Arts and
Commerce . . . .
An Act for Securing Literary Property, ch. 26, 1785 N.C. Sess. Laws 563.
34
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“It
may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used by others
without compensation. . . . [H]owever, this is not ‘some unforeseen byproduct of a
statutory scheme.’ It is, rather, ‘the essence of copyright.’” (internal citation omitted));
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.”)..
33
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Anchoring the early copyright scheme was the construction of
the author in Romantic terms.35 As the Connecticut statute
suggests, the status of an author was conceptualized as a gifted,
autonomous person capable of producing works that, if not original
genius, were merely inspired by others.36 The antithesis of the
author deserving of a copyright monopoly was the plagiarist who
appropriated the work of others as his own.37 This aspirational
ideal of a lone author, expressing his genius on paper or canvas in
a candlelit study or studio, served to justify the extension of a timelimited economic monopoly in the work to only a qualified few.38
However, the adoption of a narrowly drawn author within a
protection regime bent toward economic benefit would necessarily
prefer certain authors and certain types of authorship over others.39
These we see illustrated in several foundational copyright
doctrines. First, the originality requirement by its terms excludes
musical compositions that are shown to be borrowed or too directly
derivative of others.40 While this may seem like an obvious
constraint on protection, it clearly disfavors works created within
openly intertextual or synchretic genres where authors freely
acknowledge that their work flows from folk or other traditions

35

See Kwall, “Authors Stories,” supra note 10, at 19–21.
See id. at 21.
37
Kembrew McLeod has observed that “[p]rint culture resulted in attempts to close
down intertextuality by emphasizing Romantic notions of ‘originality’ and ‘creativity,’
and at this time there came into being the notion that words can be privately owned.”
KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP, AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 72 (2001). This led to a notion of the work as subject to
commodification, which of course had implications for the meaning of ownership. Id.
Law would regulate that. Id. “The thread that ties these concepts together is copyright
law, and plagiarism provides the deeply resonating moral underpinnings for this
economically grounded legal construction.” Id.
38
Not surprisingly, seminal cases addressing the issue of copyrightability repeatedly
struggle at the bottom with the question of the deserving author. See, e.g., Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252–53 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“The clause of the Constitution giving Congress power to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective works and discoveries, does not, as I think, embrace a
mere advertisement of a circus.”).
39
See Kwall, “Authors Stories,” supra note 10, at 19–21.
40
See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright, and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 571–73 (2006).
36
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that discourage credit-taking.41
Second, the idea/expression
dichotomy, together with the long absence of standalone rights in
musical performance, excludes from ownership non-composers as
well as composers who do not write down their work in musical
notation.42 Third, the formalities of registration and maintenance
of copyright that were not abandoned until the 1976 Act favored
literate musical authors with the personal means or external
resources to secure formal ownership of their work while
disfavoring the great many musicians who did not.43 Finally, the
principle of the autonomous work embedded in the Romantic
author ideal discounted the efforts of authors of joint and collective
works.44 These and other doctrinal rules would disproportionately
affect African-American artists, as Professor K.J. Greene has
convincingly argued.45 The historical analysis will show how
these rules would provide multiple avenues for expropriation by
non-author intermediaries who, primarily motivated by economic
gain, would structure the artist-distributor relationship around
adhesion and a dispossession of ownership.46 The point for now is
that the move from natural rights to economic incentives facilitated
such inequitable arrangements.
Another consequence of drawing the author concept narrowly
is the ease with which she may be characterized as an economic
actor. As she responds efficiently to economic incentives, her
identity as an artist recedes. Modern copyright case law is
dominated not just by concern for the economic interplay in
ownership rights, but also by a conception of the author as
responsive to financial incentives in ways no different than other
market participants.47 She is a producer of “public goods.”48
41

See MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 73–77.
See, e.g., Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 377–80.
43
See id. at 353–54.
44
See Kwall, “Authors Stories,” supra note 10, at 5.
45
See generally Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16.
46
See infra Part II.B.
47
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (citation omitted)); accord Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.”).
42
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Legal commentators, even very thoughtful legal commentators,
often view the return for her labor in stark business terms, much as
a manufacturer, a stockbroker, or a small business person views
her labor.49 What makes much of the analysis resonate is the fact
that the modern copyright author-rights holder is in fact a business
person. Indeed, in the case of music, the author is probably a
corporation, such as a record company. But that does not negate
the existence of an artist-author behind the initial creation of the
musical work. It simply converts her legally and figuratively into
an employee of the record label.50 Thus, the gradual erosion of the
Romantic author ideal in favor of an economic actor restricted the
range of authorial identity. Ironically, it also made it easier to
attack the current expansion of copyright ownership rights once
that “author” became a very powerful and expansive economic
actor.
A corollary to expansive economic actors as authors is that
creative authors may be easily reduced to the status of employees
with no ownership rights to respect, and worse, easily exploited
“talent” without the business sophistication to demand better or the
leverage to resist aggressive business behavior.51 As we see in Part
II, black artists in particular were denied both of the chief virtues
of the copyrights holder, receiving neither the economic benefits of
authorship nor the credit for and control of their work.52 In sum,
under a utilitarian variation of the Romantic author, the artist’s
48

See Ku, supra note 6, at 277 (“Public goods are generally defined by two traits.
First, once produced, they are virtually inexhaustible. This means that it is possible at no
cost for additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public good. Second, it is difficult
to prevent people from enjoying the good.” (citation omitted)).
49
See, e.g., id. at 305–08 (arguing that music creation now costs relatively little and
that because musicians make most of their money outside of copyright, ownership rights
are no longer relevant).
50
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903) (noting that
the material in question could be copyrighted by the employer because it had “been
produced by persons employed and paid by the [employer] in [the employer’s]
establishment to make those very things”); see also Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co.,
809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing Bleistein as the origin for the work-forhire doctrine).
51
See Julie Katzman, Note, Joint Authorship of Commissioned Works, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 867, 875–81 (1989) (noting that the work-for-hire doctrine may be especially
inefficient regarding commissioned work).
52
See infra Part II.
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investment of creativity has been too easily discounted and
unprotected.
B. Authorial Personality
What is missing might be called authorial personality—
whatever that is. We are slow to recognize an interest in
personality in part because it is hard to determine its contents or its
scope. The challenge is particularly difficult for law. A few courts
and a great many commentators have suggested that our utilitarian
justification for intellectual property rights—especially aesthetic
works capable of copyright protection, such as most music—
protect something like authorial personality.53 The most quoted
judicial acknowledgment comes from Justice Holmes in Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,54 who is explicit in his
conclusion that, beyond recognition, what gets protection in an
original work of authorship is personality:
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual
upon nature. Personality always contains something
unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it
something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.
That something he may copyright unless there is a
restriction in the words of the act.55
Other courts (though few of them recent) have almost
suggested as much.56 In these conceptions, personality is special
53

See e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection
of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1938 (1990) (stating that copyrights
should only be sought to “safeguard personal goodwill” when a work shows “authorial
personality”); Stephen P. Tarolli, Comment, The Future of Information Commerce Under
Contemporary Contract and Copyright Principles, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1639, 1642–43
(“The prevailing judicial interpretation of modern U.S. copyright law fails to guarantee
protection to works of information and other utilitarian works of high labor but low
creative authorship. The law would be more true to its historical origins if it recognized a
binary approach to copyright protection that: (1) protects the author’s expression in high
authorship works, and (2) protects the author’s commercial investment in low authorship
or utilitarian works.”).
54
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
55
Id. at 250.
56
See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir.
1951) (“No large measure of novelty is necessary.”).
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but not necessarily good, unique for being the only one of its kind,
ordinary yet mysteriously capable.57 The threshold is well below
genius or gifted—in trademark terms, perhaps merely distinctive.58
Most commentators who have argued for greater recognition of
authorial personality ultimately conclude that U.S. copyright law
should adopt some version of moral rights,59 as most European
countries have.60 Moral rights protect attribution and integrity.61
Roberta Kwall, for instance, argues that U.S. copyright’s
abandonment of the artist’s intrinsic, non-economic motivations to
innovate was unnecessary.62 Recognizing the “intrinsic dimension
of creativity” was possible alongside utilitarian justifications,63 she
emphasizes that “the prevailing law and policies deemphasize the
intrinsic process of creation in favor of a narrative favoring
dissemination, commodification, and economic reward.”64
Ultimately, she argues in favor of moral rights.
Similarly, Doris Long argues for adopting some version of
moral rights—especially of disclosure and integrity—in light of the
increasing lack of authorial control.65 Forgotten by economic
57

Id. at 102.
See Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (stating that “Marks are
often classified in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness; . . . they may be (1)
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” (citations omitted)).
59
See, e.g., Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 390–91;
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 290–303
(1988); Kwall, “Authors Stories,” supra note 37, at 5; Doris Estelle Long, Dissonant
Harmonization: Limitations on “Cash N’ Carry” Creativity, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1163,
1204–05 (2007).
60
See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; see
also Kimberly Y.W. Holst, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the Protection
of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 105 (2006)
(“All countries that are party to the Berne Convention are required to provide a minimum
level of protection for moral rights.”).
61
See NIMMER, supra note 28, § 8D.02(C) (noting incorporation into the Berne
Convention). Generally speaking, attribution is the right of the author to be correctly
identified as the author of a work. Id. § 8D.03. Integrity is the author’s right to prohibit
objectionable uses or derogations of the work. Id. § 8D.04.
62
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of
the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1949 (2006).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1983.
65
Long, supra note 59, at 1193.
58
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analyses and rejected by post-structuralism, creativity has been
devalued: “The importance of authorship has been questioned;
creativity has been largely disconnected from it; and any authorial
control under copyright is rapidly devolving into a ‘cash n’ carry’
compensatory right, reducing the relationship between authorship,
copyright, and control to little more than an economic right of
compensation.”66
Whether a musician’s personality resides in matters of control,
attribution, or other aspects of integrity such that moral rights are
the appropriate remedy is complicated by a fuller discussion of
financial dynamics in the next Part.67 Nevertheless, these
observations strengthen the overarching argument that more
recognition is both needed and possible even within the existing
theoretical framework for intellectual property protection.
Musicians themselves know personality when they feel it. As the
following account from the early recording era shows, authorial
personality expresses something unmistakable about the self,
which can then be combined and communicated with others:
When they recorded, the musicians were astounded
to hear themselves on disk, disembodied and
unadorned. In 1925, Hoagy Carmichael and his
Indiana friends made their first recording, and “tears
came to our eyes as we listened to it. Tears of
affection for each other, tears at the imagined
beauty of our playing. Every note an individual
thing; a part of the man who played it and that man
a friend”—but now every note was apart from the
man, and that disembodiment helped to inspire the
strong emotion. When Eddie Condon and others
heard their first disks in 1928, they knew that their
experiences had been translated into oddly
satisfying new artifacts. “The nights and years of
playing in cellars and saloons and ballrooms, of
practicing separately and together, of listening to
Louis and Joe Oliver and Jimmy Noone and Leon
66
67

Id. at 1167 (footnotes omitted).
See infra Part I.C.
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Rappolo, of losing sleep and breathing bad air and
drinking licorice gin, paid off. . . . We had never
been an audience for ourselves. . . . At the finish,
we were all laughing and pounding each other on
the back.”68
This mysterious capacity to have the hours of one’s life known
in the work reflects a more Hegelian view of property rights, as I
discuss next.
C. The Hegelian Turn and the Author’s Personhood
From Hegel, we get a clear articulation of a personality
justification for intellectual property and an acknowledgment of
the unique character of creation that goes beyond the establishment
of exclusive rights incident to the mere execution of labor. Under
Hegel, property provides an avenue for self-actualization,69 or, as
Margaret Radin wrote, enriched “personhood.”70 It accomplishes
this through the individual’s investment and expression of
personality. “Personality,” according to Hegel, “is that which acts
to overcome this restriction and to give itself reality, or in other
words to claim that other world as its own.”71 Property rights in
one’s work, therefore, are partially justified as the manifestation of
one’s personality72 and “the first existence of freedom.”73 A
personality justification is particularly suited to the copyright of
aesthetic works.74
But if intellectual property embodies so much of an author’s
personality, how would Hegel justify its free alienability? The
68

BURTON W. PERETTI, THE CREATION OF JAZZ: MUSIC, RACE, AND CULTURE IN URBAN
AMERICA 153 (1992) (citations omitted); see also ROLAND GELATT, THE FABULOUS
PHONOGRAPH 1877–1977, at 213–24 (2d rev. ed. 1977); PAUL OLIVER, SONGSTERS AND
SAINTS: VOCAL TRADITIONS ON RACE RECORDS 2–3 (1984).
69
See Hughes, supra note 59, at 333. See generally Hegel, infra note 71.
70
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 37–40 (1996).
71
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶ 39
(T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1945) (1821).
72
Id. ¶ 51.
73
Id. ¶ 45.
74
Copyrights in aesthetic works are also well-suited to a labor theory. While a labor
theory may justify granting protection to all, if not most, categories of intellectual
property, personality may not. See Hughes, supra note 59, at 339–40.
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answer lay in the belief that alienation involves the externalization
of the author’s self to be shared and absorbed by other selves.75
The sharing for payment constitutes an important recognition of
that author’s personhood.76 Should the form of sharing matter—
say, selling copies versus selling ownership? Probably somewhat,
since the latter may also constitute an abandonment. But
increasingly the chief benefit of ownership is exchange through
licensing, which provides authors with control over ever
broadening means to reach audiences. Thus, Hegelian personality
considerations point us back toward the utilitarian rationale: Artists
must be compensated as authors for the expressions of their
personality. Exchange by itself does no harm. Exploitation and
appropriation do harm—at least equal to infringement harm—
because they negate the potential for freedom and deny both of the
interests that copyright law should protect, utility and personality.77
The remaining question is, what is the personality interest?
D. The Musician’s Personality Interest and Appropriative Harm
You’ve taken my blues and gone—
75

HEGEL, supra note 71, ¶ 71.
Id.; Hughes, supra note 59, at 349. This gives rise to a paradox of alienation,
according to Professor Justin Hughes. Hegel believed that recognition of personhood
occurred in the alienation of a work’s copies but not through sale (i.e., abandonment) of
the whole. Hughes suggested that Hegel’s personality theory is a better justification for
protection than for exchange. Hughes, supra note 59, at 345. He describes it as follows:
The present owner maintains ownership because he identifies the
property as an expression of his self. Alienation is the denial of this
personal link to an object. But if the personal link does not exist—if
the object does not express or manifest part of the individual’s
personality—there is no foundation for property rights over the object
by which the “owner” may determine the object’s future. An owner’s
present desire to alienate a piece of property is connected to the
recognition that the property either is not or soon will not be an
expression of himself. Thus, the justification for property is missing.
This subtle control of the object’s future does not jibe with foreseen
future denial of the personality stake.
Id.
77
See Hughes, supra note 59, at 290–303. But see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural
Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV 453, 453–54 (2006) (“Hegel
is often cited by personality theorists, but almost always incorrectly. . . . The personality
theory of property that dominates American intellectual property scholarship is imbued
by a Romanticism that is completely antithetic to Hegel’s project.”).
76
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You sing ’em on Broadway
And you sing ’em in Hollywood Bowl,
And you mixed ’em up with symphonies
And you fixed ’em
So they don’t sound like me.
Yep, you done taken my blues and gone.78
In the introduction, I suggested that copyright law’s bundle of
rights to the rights holder is so extensive that it clearly indicates a
recognition that multiple kinds of harms may be inflicted, not all of
them economic nor always easy to pinpoint. In Part I.A, I argued
that the origins of copyright law reveal a recognition that the
interests protected by copyright law are not exclusively economic,
even though modern courts have treated them as such.79 In Part
I.B–C, I argued that a personality interest should be elevated
alongside a strictly utilitarian or economic interest.80 The question
now is, what is that interest? The answer is that we often know an
interest by the harms to it.
Tort law is full of examples of this. The dignitary interest, for
instance, is known mainly by the harm of offense to dignity, which
we assume occurs when a personal space is intentionally invaded81

78

LANGSTON HUGHES, Note on Commercial Theater, in POETRY FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 34
(Sterling Publ’g Co. 1994).
79
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206–07 (2003) (noting that in addition to
international concerns, Congress passed the CTEA in light of demographic, economic,
and technological changes, and rationally credited projections that longer terms would
encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their
works); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“The Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
80
See supra Part I.B.
81
See, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967)
(“Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently the
defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual harm, but also for those which
are offensive and insulting.”).
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or a peace to which we are entitled is intentionally disrupted.82
Reputational harm at common law assumed that a serious affront
to sensibility would inevitably occur as a result of certain words
spoken.83 All of these examples have a character of appropriative
harm, and appropriative harm is at the essence of the harm inflicted
on a music author’s personality interest when aspects of the bundle
of copyright rights are infringed.
Similarly, the law of racial discrimination is replete with
negative definitions of personal interests. When Kenneth Karst,
analyzing civil rights law in the context of the Brown v. Board of
Education84 decision, attempted to define harm in positive terms,
he referred to it as the frustrated desire for belonging and the right
to inclusion under law that accompanies citizenship.85 But his
analysis was clearer when he described the negation of that interest
as stigma.86 Stigma, he explained, is certainly psychic harm to the
personality, but it often manifests itself in economic disadvantage
as well.87 It is a product of the loss, the non-static result of the
taking.88
We may therefore understand a music author’s personality
interest in her creative work by the special loss she experiences
from its expropriation. In this conception, the content of the
personality interest may be more clearly understood through the
loss of the thing (and the loss of control of the thing) than by the
thing itself. Put another way, the measure of what is gained by
copyright ownership is what is not lost to coerced control,
unauthorized adaptation or infringement. The loss of selfhood
through the theft of one’s creation inflicts an incalculable kind of
harm. As the Langston Hughes poem above suggests and like the
Ornette Coleman statement earlier,89 the harm of loss represents
82

See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 292 (Cal. 1952).
See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (stating that the common law
against slander was designed to address society’s “pervasive and strong interest in
preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation”).
84
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
85
See KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 15–27 (Yale 1989).
86
See id. at 25–27.
87
See id. at 26–27.
88
See id. at 25–27.
89
See supra text accompanying notes 1 and 78.
83
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something profound about the relationship between authorship and
ownership that copyright can and should recognize.90 That
recognition goes beyond the remedial question of whether
monetary compensation for theft is enough. Based on a review of
past wrongs to artists, it supports the present-day conclusion that
limiting or abolishing copyright is one of the worst things we could
do to music authors.
This somewhat simple, rather vague idea, will get more
contour in the next Part when I explore the various ways the
development of the modern recording industry model used
copyright law to reproduce personality injury to black music
authors. For now, however, it is important to consider two
contemporary implications of recognizing personality in
appropriative harm, the “information analogy” and wealth.
By the information analogy, I refer to the increasingly
commonplace statement that music is information or, more
accurately, that because of the technology that brings us digital
music downloads, music is a lot like other information that may be
digitized and easily downloaded.91 What often follows from this
characterization of music is the assertion that “information wants
to be free.”92 There are several flaws in this analogy. The primary
flaw is that it originates from a music consumer’s perspective, not
an author’s, and that it is utterly dependent upon advanced
technology for its truth.93 In a world of only live music, for
instance, calling music another form of information would make
90

Indeed, it is profound enough to lament in poetry and other very personal, nonmonetizable expressions of loss.
91
Michael Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came to View Musical
Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1406–07 (2004) (“Some
declare that ‘information wants to be free’ and that music, like all other forms of digitized
cultural expression, no longer can be or should be treated as proprietary information.”);
see RONALD S. ROSEN, MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT 152–59 (2008) (discussing, inter alia,
Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Cal. 1937)).
92
Carroll, supra note 91, at 1406–07.
93
See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries
of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 56 n.154 (2004) (“The author cites
attempts to curb reverse engineering and parodying as two prime examples of
overreaching which put copyright owners in a bad light. . . . End users and consumers,
on the other hand, overreach when claiming that information ‘wants to be free’ and that
they should therefore be allowed to freely share movies across peer-to-peer networks.”).
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little sense. The deeper problem with the analogy is its
corresponding conclusion that music must therefore cost little or
nothing to obtain.94 If we imagine the music author’s ownership
interest in strictly economic terms, we struggle only to arrive at an
ever diminishing price.95 However, if we recognize a personality
interest in the musical work, we are more apt to see that the
conclusion imposes categorical opposition between music author
and consumer.96 If music is really information that should be free
to consumers, authors are mere service providers who require no
more incentive to create than the prevailing wage. Copyright law
should avoid that. While the author’s personality interest is only
faintly drawn in copyright jurisprudence,97 a consumer interest has
no recognized basis.98
Second, the same technological changes that give rise to a
belief that music is information demonstrate that a music author’s
personality interest may easily converge with his economic
interest.99 Digitization, as we will see in the final Part, greatly
reduces the costs of music production.100 With lower costs come
expectations of lower prices to consumers.101 Eventually, as A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.102 teaches, those expectations join
with the self-help nature of new technologies to take for nothing
what one no longer wishes to negotiate on the market.103 The
lesson of copyright law reform today may be that we struggle to

94

Id.
See Ku, supra note 6, at 306–319.
96
See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 61, 63 (2002).
97
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 reads: “Congress shall have the power . . . . To promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” See also
Justin Hughes, The Personal Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 89–90 (1998).
98
Hughes, supra note 97, at 89–90.
99
See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 106(3) (West 2008).
100
See Ku, supra note 6, at 306.
101
Id. at 319 (explaining that even if the price is low, the consumer would still be
“unwilling” to pay).
102
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
103
See Ku, supra note 6, at 273–74.
95
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find effective ways to capture those lost fees for the author.104
Given the technology, the capture problem may only increase in
proportion to the range of uses that become available for the music.
Each of these is both a potential loss of self (personality) and of
compensation for the author’s present and future welfare
(economic). The music author must retain the rights with which to
recapture those losses. In the past, the loss of those rights was
attributable mainly to the exploitative practices of record labels
and intermediaries, as the next Part shows.105 In the future, as
artists become more independent, those losses will be attributable
mainly to the appropriative practices of consumers, as the final
Part shows.106 Rights retention remains the best safeguard against
whatever changes occur. Ownership is not only the thing that may
validate and remunerate now. It is the foundation for an author’s
wealth and control in the future. In that sense, it represents a true
investment of self that copyright law should encourage.
Having introduced the duel theoretical framework (utility and
personality) for conceiving of property rights in music, I look now
to how these ideas took form in U.S. music history. Specifically, I
browse the history of African-American musical authorship to
show how, like canaries in a coalmine, the appropriative harms
committed against them were facilitated by the structure of
copyright law and repeated against other musical authors.
II. OWNERSHIP CAPTURE, BLACK MUSICAL AUTHORS, AND THE
FRACTURE OF PERSONALITY: A SUBALTERN HISTORY
This Part provides an abbreviated history of the law and
business practices of music production in the United States, with
particular emphasis on black musicians and the genres most
identified with them. I organize the mostly descriptive discussion

104

The online music industry continues to be very unstable and offers few sustainable
business models for profitability. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Music Labels Ease Up to Assist
Start-ups, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at B1 (describing the failure of multiple legal online music start-ups and the corresponding lowering of major label license fees to new
ones based on the inability to achieve profitability).
105
See infra Part II.A.
106
See infra Part IV.
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chronologically, beginning with two important nineteenth century
musical genres—spirituals and minstrelsy—and the legislative
struggles to pass the 1909 Act. I end with trends leading to our
current digital environment.107
Several conceptual fault lines emerge. First, as Lisa Gitelman
points out, the early legislative period saw the introduction of a
dichotomy between “writing” and “reading,” which had
tremendous implications for what received legal protection and
arguably continues in some form to this day.108 Second, the
secondary status given to performers and performance under
copyright law has been a critical lever in determining the scope of
economic benefit and artistic recognition under music copyright
law.109 Third, there is a continuing tension between appropriation
and mimicry in both the law’s treatment of claims as well as in the
ability of black musicians in particular to benefit from their
works.110 For them, where appropriation of their work facilitated
mimicry by white performers, their labor was most easily
expropriated.111 Finally, however, this capture of black musicians’
styles, songs, performances, and earnings often seemed to lead to
“innovative escape”—a Houdini-esque maneuvering back into
creative relevance and musical livelihood following the theft of

107

Music was often a puzzle for copyright, especially in the beginning. See Lisa
Gitelman, Reading Music, Reading Records, Reading Race: Musical Copyright and the
U.S. Copyright Act of 1909, 81 MUSICAL Q. 265, 273 (1997) (“The combination of
pliable uses and new forms made music hard to pin down. The varied economy of
American music at the end of the nineteenth century was perched on the edge of mass
culture: it relied on noninstitutional as well as institutional means of creating markets for
its principal commodity, printed sheet music, while it proved less able to commodify
musical performances, phonograph records, and piano rolls in a rational or universal
way.”).
The history could be presented differently by treating, for instance, changes in
technology as the critical moments in the system’s development, such as the move from
sheet music to phonograph records, the introduction of radio, or the proliferation of the
compact disc. Alternatively, one could follow genres, tracking themes as they adapt or
dissipate within the public’s consumption of one type of music or another. I will attempt
to include both perspectives in the chronology.
108
Id. at 275.
109
See Sunny Noh, Better Late Than Never: The Legal Theoretical Reasons Supporting
the Performance Rights Act of 2009, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 83–84 (2009).
110
See infra Part III.A.
111
RICHARD CRAWFORD, AMERICA’S MUSICAL LIFE: A HISTORY 197 (2001).

C01_TROUTT_3-9-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/31/2010 1:04 PM

I OWN THEREFORE I AM

397

one’s earlier expression—and the emergence of new music. These
concepts describe a system of rights that devalued personality and
would often subsume it. Ironically, it also revealed artist
personalities that persevered anyway. Together, the concepts help
define what it has meant to be a musician in the American music
industry and provide a context for evaluating the copyright reform
proposals that have been introduced since digital distribution.
A. Cultural Capture and the Miner’s First Canaries: Spirituals
and Minstrelsy in the Nineteenth Century
From the beginning, the expression of personality through
music has been both fraught and essential for African Americans
and American whites. It was fraught in that slaveholders
demanded music from blacks, though with significant restrictions
such as the outlawing of drums,112 and in the duplicitous way that
blacks performed musical meanings in whites’ presence.113 It was
also essential as a means of integrating and understanding lived,
often excruciating, experiences.114 These general tensions were
evident in two important forms of music, spirituals and minstrelsy,
and both began during slavery and survived well after it.
Spirituals—the sacred songs that emerged from plantation life
such as “Go Down, Moses” and “Swing Low, Sweet Chariot”—
combined a religious poetry unique to slaves with many musical
antecedents from African culture and the surviving rituals such as
ring shouts.115 During and after the Civil War, white abolitionists
collected and circulated these spirituals in the accurate belief that
the music’s beauty would reveal the humanity of blacks and “their
fitness to live as free Americans.”116 Beyond what the spirituals
themselves meant to ex-slaves, the recognition by whites of the
form represented a source of dignified personhood in authorship,
one “owned” by slave creators and ultimately “shared” with whites
112

Id. at 410.
See, e.g., id. at 408 (describing how a slave song that started “I am going away to the
great house farm, O yea! O yea! O yea!,” was “jargon to others, but full of meaning” to
the slaves, who “told a tale of grief and sorrow”).
114
Id. at 408–09.
115
See id. at 416–18.
116
Id. at 415.
113
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as distinctly “American.”117 (It is doubtful, however, that the
economic benefits of creative authorship came to blacks upon
publication of the spirituals.)
Yet white acknowledgment of black personality was more
ambivalent and opportunistic in minstrelsy. During slavery, “[t]he
minstrel persona offered white entertainers and audiences a chance
to visit and explore expressive territory that would otherwise have
remained private.”118 This occurred behind black face, performed
by “negro impersonators” and “Ethiopian delineators” who
mimicked stereotypical “coon” dialect, behavior, and attitudes to
dance and music.119 White minstrels created demeaning characters
like Zip Coon (the urban rascal) and Jim Crow (the country
Sambo) whose popularity included White House performances.120
White minstrelsy appropriated the music and the instruments used
by black slaves, such as the banjo.121 It assumed falsity in the way
that blacks presented themselves to whites and exploited this social
mechanism as a liberating mask behind which whites could
express social commentary about their own conditions.122 White
minstrels engaged in a studied theft of black personality and music,
creating a popular decades-long industry that black minstrels
eventually joined.123
The point of this music historical allegory so far is not to
reiterate longstanding racial critiques but rather to illustrate how,
during the emergence of distinctly American musical forms and
the development of the nation’s early treatment of copyright, race
was the artist’s first canary in the proverbial coalmine. That is, the
early imposition on music of common themes of racial hierarchy,

117

Crawford’s account suggests that this may have been one of the earliest instances of
an American musical heritage: “In fact, the circulation of spirituals after the Civil War
gave many white Americans their first hint that if the United States was a nation with its
own distinctive music, the ex-slave population was in large part responsible.” Id. at 412.
118
Id. at 198.
119
See id. at 199–201.
120
See id. at 201–02.
121
Id. at 205.
122
See id. at 198–99.
123
Id. at 218. According to Crawford, the trend lived on: “In their challenge to
civilized decorum, blackface minstrels of the 1840s and early 1850s hold traits in
common with rock-and-roll musicians from the 1950s on.” Id. at 198.
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subordination, and role-playing for complex purposes of
personhood would continue to play out as acceptable—even
expected—constructs in how ownership and authorship were
defined. In particular, the subsuming of personality into economic
interests by copyright law would facilitate the inequitable structure
of the music business for most music artists. It began largely with
people who had no economic agency worth recognizing and who
occupied the status of free labor—slaves and freedmen. Almost
none of these creators owned copyrights in their works.
B. Legal Capture: Nineteenth Century Copyright and Passage of
the 1909 Act
The commercial exploitation of any copyrighted work often
requires the participation of professional intermediaries to sell it.
Much of the history of music copyright features the role of nonauthor intermediaries, particularly publishers who, given the
primacy of sheet music and their control of printing presses, have
always been regarded as central to copyright’s scheme.124 It was
their insistence that led to many of the provisions of the first
copyright act in 1790;125 when music was added in 1831, only
sheet music was copyrightable.126 These business-side facts of
music production were reflected doctrinally in the idea/expression
dichotomy, which privileged only music that had been transcribed
into conventional notation.127 The creative-side consequence was
to demand a basic literacy for copyright protection. For the
public’s enjoyment, music would be “read”—played at home on

124

Carroll, supra note 91, at 1410.
Susanna Monseau, “Fit for Purpose”: Why the European Union Should Not Extend
the Term of Related Rights Protection in Europe, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 629, 643 (2009).
126
Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (amended 1856); see Joiner, supra note 2,
at 46 (“The composers . . . did not consider seriously the various musical boxes, barrel
organs, bird organs, chiming clocks and snuff boxes that had been known for centuries as
encroaching on any of their rights . . . as these inadequate mechanical contrivances could
play but a limited number of musical airs and could play them only under severe
limitations.”).
127
See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN.
L. REV. 321, 337 (1989) (discussing White-Smith Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908), and its implications for the idea/expression doctrine in various musical forms).
125
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the piano, heard in performance.128 For ownership, music would
be “written.”129 However, prior to the adoption of the 1909
Copyright Act, musicians who sought ownership of their creative
work could rely only on a hodgepodge of state common law
rules.130 After transcribing her composition, an artist would have
to follow the formalities to copyright registration with the
Copyright Office, including deposit and renewal.131 Failure to
satisfy these requirements would release the work to the world or
at least limit the term of ownership.132 Music authors frequently
had a difficult time obtaining and enforcing copyrights in their
work.133
The music publishers, on the other hand, did not have difficulty
obtaining and enforcing copyrights, and they held a dominant
position in the music industry until about 1920, largely because of
their (sometimes shared) ownership of composition copyrights and
their control over access to music consumers.134 Publishers
exercised power during this period by giving songwriters a flat fee
for their compositions, rarely paying royalties,135 and forcing
songwriters to transfer their copyrights to them.136 At its height in
the late nineteenth century, the group of powerful music publishers
located in New York’s Tin Pan Alley engineered the country’s

128

Gitelman, supra note 107, at 285.
Id. at 275.
130
The Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), covered
only books, maps, and charts. Statutory protection for other types of creative works
expanded over time. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 719, 744–45 (2009).
131
NIMMER, supra note 28, § 7.16(A).
132
Some states enforced copyrights in unpublished works under state common law.
Exclusive rights under the Act were limited to reproduction, adaptation (the right mainly
to prepare derivative works), and distribution/performance. See id. § 7.16(A)(2)(b).
133
The difficulty partly came from the strict requirement on “deposit” under the Act.
In order to facilitate the requisition of an author’s copyright, the Supreme Court, in
Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939), held that the words
“promptly deposited,” in section 13 of the Act, might not be read as a condition
subsequent that, if not satisfied, would result in destruction of the copyright. Id. at 32.
134
See CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 222 (“The sheet-music trade required several
agents . . . . Each played a necessary role, but publishers were the chief architects.”).
135
See id. at 472–73.
136
See id. at 473.
129
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tastes in popular music.137 These publishers employed songwriters
to produce new arrangements of existing songs and song
“promoters” to ensure that their products were used in the most
popular shows and played by the most popular bands.138 Tin Pan
Alley controlled the music of Broadway, the concert halls,
cabarets, dance halls, vaudeville, minstrelsy, and other popular
music outlets.139
Publishers would gain access to the original scores and republish them, attributing authorship to the company or a composer
related with the company,140 often reworking the original score by
simplifying the melodies.141 Within this general practice, the
exercise (or usurpation) of authorial power over black music—
changing, sanitizing, or simplifying it in order to satisfy perceived
white tastes—is a trend that runs through the entire history of black
musical authorship in the United States.
Technology and America’s racial culture altered the balance of
power in the late-nineteenth century music industry in ways that
would be reflected in the 1909 Act. Specifically, the dispute
involving a music publisher and a manufacturer of then-popular
piano rolls revealed the confusion over the copyright statute’s
definition of a readable “copy.” The defendant in White-Smith
Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.142 had created perforated piano
rolls of two popular “coon” songs whose copyrights had been
assigned by the composer to the plaintiff.143 The legal issue in
137

See id. at 471 (“New York City’s magnetic pull in the field of entertainment during
the nineteenth century’s later years turned it into the capital of popular-song publishing in
the United States.”).
138
See id. at 474–75.
139
See id. at 471–76.
140
See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 150; id. at 162 (“[T]he players’ talents were seen by
industries as a raw material, an abstract production resource that they alienated from the
musicians.”).
141
Id. at 149.
142
209 U.S. 1 (1908).
143
The songs were “Kentucky Babe” and “Little Cotton Dolly.” Id. at 8. Below is an
illustrative excerpt from a coon song, “Whistling Coon,” as recorded by the popular black
minstrel George Johnson, probably in 1891, who used to sing it on the street.
Oh, I’ve seen in my time some very funny folks,
But the funniest of all I know,
Is a colored individual as sure as you’re alive,
He’s black as any black crow . . .
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White-Smith Music mirrored the cultural issue: whether a
perforated sheet, indecipherable to the human eye, was a copy like
a duplicate page of sheet music?144 Underlying this legal issue was
a cultural one: what were the racial meanings of a blackface genre
that had once been seen but might, with the aid of technology, only
be heard?
The Court resolved the case in favor of the piano roll
manufacturer because the perforations existed in some ambiguous
realm between reading and writing.145 With the passage of the
1909 Act, however, the legal conflict was resolved in favor of a
composer’s right against unlicensed mechanical reproductions.146

You may talk until you’re tired, but you’ll never get a word
From this very funny queer old coon . . .
He’s a knock-kneed, double-jointed, hunky-plunky moke
But he’s happy when he whistles this tune . . .
(Whistles refrain)
He’s got a pair of lips, like a pound of liver split,
And a nose like an injun rubber shoe,
He’s a limpy, happy, chuckle-headed huckleberry nig,
And he whistles like happy killy loo . . .
He’s an independent, free and easy, fat and greasy ham,
With a cranium like a big baboon . . .
Say! I never heard him talk to anybody in my life,
But he’s happy when he whistles this tune . . .
(Whistles refrain)
TIM BROOKS, LOST SOUNDS: BLACKS AND THE BIRTH OF THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 1890–
1919, at 28 (2004). As described by Gitelman, “the coon song was a complex, latenineteenth-century survival of an already intricate and naggingly visual experience, the
midcentury minstrel show.” Gitelman, supra note 107, at 276. The coon song was not
part of minstrel shows, but shared its traditions. Id. at 277. It peaked in popularity as
reflected in sheet music sales in the late 1890s, eclipsing the popularity of minstrelsy and
finding a place in recordings. Id. This changed the class make-up of listeners. See id.
(“Whereas minstrelsy had been an acknowledged white, working-class form, the coon
song allowed middle-class penetration of its tradition, and coon songs were played in
middle-class parlors, concerts, syndicated vaudeville, and the other bourgeois venues
where sheet music was increasingly consumed.”).
144
See White-Smith Music, 209 U.S. at 17.
145
See id. at 18 (“These perforated rolls are parts of a machine which, when duly
applied and properly operated in connection with the mechanism to which they are
adapted, produce musical tones in harmonious combination. But we cannot think that
they are copies within the meaning of the copyright act.”).
146
Gitelman, supra note 107, at 283. Congress swiftly responded to this decision by
broadly drafting language that stated that copyright existed in music “in any system of
notation or any form of record,” specifically passing § 1(e), which deemed mechanical
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Unresolved was the racial question of a performer’s identity. The
composer of a coon song—black or white—feigned blackness by
employing certain stereotypes; so did the performer—black or
white.147 The composer’s identity as author was now protected
under the 1909 Act, but not the performer’s.148 “[T]he result was
an even more heightened sense of ‘the talent’ as a commodity.”149
Further, without disclosure the race of the singer would remain
ambiguous, leading to what Gitelman calls “racial
ventriloquism”—the unseen white singer who sounded black—
which would only be enhanced with the popularity of radio and
phonograph records.150 Of course, these developments had direct
consequences for the economic and personality interests of black
musicians whose works, styles and even caricatures were being
appropriated by whites from a kind of cultural commons.
C. Performance, the Phonograph, and Radio Under the 1909 Act
Few factors would affect all musicians’ rights and incomes like
the various and intense disputes about performance rights and
performers under the 1909 Copyright Act. This section looks at
reproductions of music as copies. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 30 Stat. 1075,
1076 (repealed 1976). However, it also struck several compromises, one of which was
the creation of a compulsory licensing provision in which once the “owner of a musical
copyright has used or permitted . . . use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of
instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may”
do so provided they pay the copyright proprietor a two-cent royalty on each part
manufactured. Id.; see Gitelman, supra note 107, at 285 (“[R]eadings under the 1909 act
were made into writings.”).
147
In a sense, this type of music could be a veritable theater of racial performance. The
imitation of black musical origins by white composers and performers comprised its own
idea of popular blackness, which itself could be reproduced—even by blacks, who
adopted certain stereotypes of themselves to accommodate white consumer expectations
of an authentic black sound. Other types of music—namely, the blues, soul and later
rap—employ their own conventions of racial performance based on popular stereotypes.
148
See Gitelman, supra note 107, at 283.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 277–78. The performance of race, like the performance of musical
composition, was often contested, and the resolution of the conflict coincided with the
division of property rights under copyright. See id. at 276–78. Limiting the rights in
performance would not only limit the composer’s exclusive rights, but for manufacturers
of phonographs and record companies, it might contribute to a more competitive market
for performers. Id. at 283. Thus, both a cultural and commercial rationale underlay the
secondary treatment of performers.
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the contests between publisher power and the power of two giants
either in their infancy or not yet born in 1909, record companies
and radio broadcasters.151 The denial of sound recording rights
until 1972 reflects the early hegemony of publishers as well as the
availability of state law alternatives.152 Their belated adoption is
testament to the power shift that saw record companies eclipse
publishers in the last decades of the twentieth century. What is
sometimes lost in the battle of titans is the near unanimous
rejection of rights in performance that would have been critical to
musicians’ interests. After all, whether they were composers and
performers or only performers, the majority of musicians then and
now received most of their income as artists from performance.153
The fact that the 1909 Act continued to regard most performance
as, in Gitelman’s analysis, unprotected “reading” of protectable
“writing,” severely disadvantaged many musicians for generations,
especially black artists who were often rendered unprotected
performers after the theft of their compositions by unscrupulous
intermediaries.154
Under the 1909 Act, one of the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner was the right to “public performance for profit.”155 In its
early days, the radio industry, as well as major radio users such as
restaurants, hotels, and ballrooms, attempted to exempt themselves
from having to pay public performance royalties.156 Broadcasters
151
See, e.g., id. at 271 (“‘[T]he industry,’ as it had now become, grew more and more
musically oriented through the 1890s, dominated in the new century by three patentholding phonograph companies, American Graphophone (later Columbia), Victor
Talking Machine (later Victor/RCA), and Edison’s National Phonograph.”); Paul Gitlin,
Radio Infringement of Music Copyright, 1 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 61, 62 (1938),
reprinted in 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 7, 15–17 (1998) (stating that “[r]adio had
grown tremendously since the first broadcast by Station KDKA” in 1920).
152
See Gitelman, supra note 107, at 283–85.
153
See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Peter Kafka, The Road to Riches,
FORBES.COM, July 7, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0707/078.html (“‘The top
10% of artists make money selling records. The rest go on tour,’ says Scott Welch, who
manages singers Alanis Morissette and LeAnn Rimes.”).
154
See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 148–49.
155
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 30 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976).
156
See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Herbert v.
Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1916); Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929);
SESAC v. N.Y. Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); M. Whitmark & Sons
v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923).
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justified their claimed exemption on the ground that radio was
essentially advertising for sheet music and record sales, despite
mounting evidence that radio was becoming a market substitute.157
In suits often brought by The American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”), publishers secured their
rights under both the “for profit”158 and “public performance”159
language.
The battles in Congress between the National
Association of Broadcasters and ASCAP were just as unrelenting,
with similar results favoring publishers.160
So the basic
performance right held by composition copyright holders stayed
firm.161
But the manufacturers of phonograph records would have no
such luck getting statutory protection for sound recordings.162
157

According to ASCAP, prior to 1925, a hit song had an average life of sixteen
months and total sheet sales of 1,156,134; by 1932, the average life of a hit song was only
three months and total sheet sales were 229,866. Gitlin, supra note 151, at 66. In 1934,
the number one hit “Love in Bloom” sold under 500,000 copies, even though it was
performed 24,374 times on the air. Id. In 1937, the top songs were “Chapel in the
Moonlight” and “When My Dream Boat Comes Home,” both of which sold under
500,000 copies, which was inversely proportional to the time these songs spent on radio
airplay. Id.
158
See, e.g., Herbert, 242 U.S. at 591 (concerning the indirect benefit to a restaurant
where the price of music is included in the price of food); M. Whitmark, 291 F. at 776
(concerning an indirect benefit to department store from music broadcasts).
159
See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 412
(6th Cir. 1925) (holding that, whether visible, live, or otherwise, the “artist is consciously
addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered, audience, and is therefore
participating in a public performance”), rev’g 298 F. 628 (S.D. Ohio 1924); Jerome H.
Remick & Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (broadcasting an
unauthorized performance constitutes contributory infringement); see also Jewell-La
Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. at 196–202 (holding that hotel’s reception and reproduction of
public radio broadcasts to individual rooms and bedrooms constituted public performance
for profit); SESAC, 19 F. Supp. at 5–6 (same). But see Debaum, 40 F.2d at 735 (holding
that, by giving radio station a public performance license, the copyright holder “impliedly
sanctioned and consented” to a café owner who played the broadcast for his patrons).
160
See Gitlin, supra note 151, at 15–17.
161
There were, of course, exceptions such as the juke box exemption. Copyright Act of
1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 30 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976) (“The reproduction or
rendition of a musical composition by or upon coin-operated machines shall not be
deemed a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged for admission to the place
where such reproduction or rendition occurs.”).
162
The House Report for the 1909 Act stated: “It is not the intention of the committee
to extend the right of copyright to the mechanical reproductions [records] themselves, but
only to give the composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the
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Three main reasons were offered. First, Congress feared that a
single company, Aeolian, would succeed in dominating the music
industry by exclusively contracting with music publishers and
buying up all recording rights in what would amount to a “musical
trust.”163 Second, Congress felt that sound recordings did not
constitute “writings” as intended by the Constitution, nor were
record companies or performers deemed “authors.” Third, there
was state copyright and common law unfair competition to protect
against unauthorized copying.164
To some extent, state law did protect sound recordings under
either common law copyright or unfair competition.165 Yet, for our

[compulsory licensing] provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and use of such
devices.” H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7–9 (1909).
163
Robert T. Mowrey, The Rise and Fall of Record Piracy, 27 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 155, 163 (1982). For the same reason, Congress implemented the compulsory
license provision.
They [Congress] were first inclined to give the copyright owner the
exclusive right to make sound recordings . . . however, it was learned
that one dominant record company, anticipating the establishment of
an exclusive recording right, had contracted with the leading music
publishers for the exclusive right to record all their music. To
forestall the danger that this company would acquire a monopoly in
the making of records, the committees adopted the device of the
compulsory license.
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW § 7a (1961).
164
Legislative committees held hearings to take up the issue of sound recording rights
under the Act during the latter part of the 1920s, when phonograph records gained
significant popularity in the market and at least four different times in the 1930s. See
Gitlin, supra note 151, at 70–71, 78–79, 81–83, 85. During House hearings in 1939,
broadcasters reiterated their arguments; authors and publishers reiterated theirs, adding
that the common law provided sufficient protection; and even lawyers chimed in to argue
for contractual, rather than ownership solutions to recording infringement. See BARBARA
A. RINGER, THE UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF SOUND RECORDINGS 33 (1957)
[hereinafter RINGER STUDY]. In the 1939 report by the ABA Copyright Committee, the
drafting of the bill was deemed defective, but the committee unanimously embraced the
idea of a copyright for recorded performances, and also mentioned that the subject of
authorship “should be determined as a matter of contract between the respective parties
contributing to the composite result, continuing the assumption of the present act that an
employer for hire has capacity for authorship.” Id. (citing Committee Reports,
1939 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 18).
165
According to Professor Nimmer, common law copyrights vest in an author of a work
when the following three elements are met: 1) there is an expression beyond an abstract
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purposes, the case law reveals the difficult position of musical
performers under a rights regime that consistently excluded them.
For example, in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.,166
Fred Waring, a white man and one of the most prominent orchestra
leaders of the day, sued a broadcasting company for playing his
recordings over the air.167 He had no exclusive right to public
performance for profit under the federal copyright regime, because
his were interpretations of popular compositions.168 But the court
was determined to find a remedy under a property theory for
performers capable of unique artistic contributions.169 The
rationale went beyond mere labor or economic incentives to create,
but to some characteristic of personality.170
“A musical
composition in itself is an incomplete work; the written page
evidences only one of the creative acts which are necessary for its
enjoyment; it is the performer who must consummate the work by
transforming it into sound,” said the court.171 Further, “such a
property right inheres in the case of those artists who elevate
interpretations to the realm of independent works of art.”172
Furthermore, because such a rendering can be captured and
reproduced, the rendering can be deemed property as firm as any
corporeal property.173 Unfortunately, the Waring reasoning was

idea; 2) it is original to the author; and 3) it is unpublished. NIMMER, supra note 28, §
4.02(C).
166
194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
167
Note that the party bringing the suit was not the copyright holder in the musical
composition (who could have a claim if the broadcast were unauthorized), but the
recording artist, whose product (the recording) was not protected under federal copyright.
168
Interestingly, the previous year, Waring actually applied to the Copyright Office for
a copyright on his musical interpretation of the song “Lullaby of Broadway.” Walter L.
Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing Artist in His Interpretive
Rendition, 1 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 9, 12 (1938). The Copyright Office rejected
the application as being beyond the scope of federal copyright law. Id.
169
See Waring, 194 A. at 635.
170
See id. at 643.
171
Id. at 635.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 632. The court seemed to imply that the interpretation has to be assessed as to
its artistic value. See id. at 635; see also Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489–90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
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not generally followed and was even repudiated on the ground that
Waring’s recording constituted a publication to the world.174
As a performer, Fred Waring was exceptional. During the
early part of the twentieth century, most performing artists,
particularly black ones, suffered a distinct lack of bargaining
power among another set of music industry intermediaries, venue
owners.175 While the publishers controlled the sheet music
revenues, the venue owners controlled the live performance
revenues. All but the most popular bands and musicians were
subject to low, flat fee payments for performances, even when
admission revenues were extremely high.176 As touring circuits
developed, owners used booking agents to coordinate
performances, and these agents quickly controlled access to
thousands of venues across the country.177 Popular performance,
therefore, was an arena of competitive conflict in which musicians’
share of financial rewards was customarily subordinated to nonmusician intermediaries.178 These relationships hardened with the
growth of the industry fueled by phonograph records and radio,
and they were accompanied by the rise of Jim Crow and the
migration to northern cities of so many black musicians from the
South.179 This legal and business architecture combined with
social relations at the time to facilitate the dispossession of music
author and performer’s rights. The personality harms lamented by
Ornette Coleman, a jazz musician, were commonplace.
174

See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 87–90 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.)
(“[W]e think that the ‘common-law property’ in these performances ended with the sale
of the records and that the restriction did not save it; and that if it did, the records
themselves could not be clogged with a servitude.”).
175
See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 148–49.
176
See id. at 148.
177
See CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 476 (“In 1896, six of these [booking] agents
joined together to form the Syndicate . . . [and by] 1926, the Syndicate boasted a network
of some seven hundred theaters nationwide.”). Because musicians and bands relied on
consistent touring for income, they were subject to the attitudes and preferences of the
booking agents. Id. During periods when it was typical for bands to play at one venue for
long periods of time, owners would threaten and carry out physical violence against
bands who attempted to play elsewhere, and booking agents would use slander or
influence to get musicians banned from touring circuits. See PERETTI, supra note 68, at
146–47.
178
See CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 478.
179
See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 58.
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1. Jazz Music
Jazz music’s place in this analytic chronology brings together
themes central to an understanding of industry capture of artists’
rights amid important racial dynamics. It illustrates more of the
imitative practices apparent in minstrelsy as well as the
appropriation of black creative ownership by an industry controlled
by and catering to whites.180 More subtly, jazz history represents
dueling adaptations that occurred partly as a result of
appropriation. That is, white record producers and club owners
often adapted black musical styles to perceived white consumer
tastes.181 Black jazz artists then adapted new musical forms to
flourish creatively and, just as importantly, to overcome economic
marginalization.182 In this case, discrimination, not ownership,
motivated the creation of new expressions of artistic personality as
well as new markets.
This last point is evident in the very genesis of jazz, as a
combination of various music disciplines, following the adoption
of Jim Crow laws in New Orleans.183 Once a cosmopolitan city
whose musical culture was influenced by the American black,
Haitian, French, Spanish, English, Irish, German, Italian, and
Cuban origins of its residents, as well from rural and regional
musical traditions,184 New Orleans became legally segregated.185
The new legislation classified Creoles as Blacks for the first
time.186 The false racial binary concentrated the disparate/existing
musical influences to create a musical culture that was urban,
180

See id. at 148 (“‘[W]hites [in the 1920s] began to realize the talent Negroes had, and
they began scheming how to commercialize it.’”); Gitelman, supra note 107, at 276–78
(discussing the appropriation of black creative ownership in minstrelsy).
181
See NIK COHN, ROCK: FROM THE BEGINNING 13 (1969).
182
See JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, THE RECEPTION OF JAZZ IN AMERICA: A NEW VIEW 24
(1988).
183
AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSIC: AN INTRODUCTION 147 (Mellonee V. Burnim & Portia
K. Maultsby eds., 2006) [hereinafter Burnim & Maultsby].
184
See id.; see also THOMAS J. HENNESSEY, FROM JAZZ TO SWING: AFRICAN-AMERICAN
JAZZ MUSICIANS AND THEIR MUSIC 1890–1935, at 15 (1994).
185
Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 147.
186
Id. Now, Creoles and Blacks had a common prejudice against them. This narrative
supports the theory that Jazz was formed through a combination of Blacks, who were
known for their brass and string band blues music, and Creoles, who were known for
their instrumental virtuosity, music literacy, and training in classical music. See id.
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competitive, sometimes violent, heavy on instrumental
improvisation, and consciously virtuoso.187 New Orleans jazz
musicians early on thought of themselves as highly skilled
“artists.”188
The dissemination of jazz also has roots in racial
discrimination. Many jazz musicians joined the Great Migration of
blacks fleeing lynching and Jim Crow oppression and seeking
better economic opportunities in northern cities.189
This
established Chicago as a destination for New Orleans musicians,190
and, like New York, it developed a complex performance culture
that promoted jazz music from within dance halls, local
cabarets,191 and touring circuits.192 A host of new intermediaries
emerged such as managers, promoters, and booking agents to
coordinate the various venues and performances.193
Along with the popularity of the music blacks brought came
familiar patterns of exploitation and racism.194 For instance, the
Theater Owners Booking Agency (“TOBA”) was the first booking
agency to feature black acts on touring circuits,195 but was
renowned for low wages and discriminatory policies, taking on the

187

See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 26–37.
Id. at 37.
189
See id. at 43. Of those that migrated from South to North between 1915 and 1920,
60,000 migrated to Chicago. Id. at 45.
190
Id.
191
See COLLIER, supra note 182, at 9 (“[A]s the music began to move north and west, it
was being played in the main in cabarets and dance halls populated with prostitutes,
despite occasional forays into vaudeville, and the impression that the music was
somehow related to sexual sin was generally accurate. Now, however, with the success
of the Original Dixieland Jass Band at a prestigious restaurant, the music was seen as
more respectable.”).
192
Hennessey notes that the bulk of black Americans still lived in the rural areas,
especially the South, in the period from 1914–23. HENNESSEY, supra note 184, at 49.
The tradition of circus and vaudeville tent show gave way to vaudeville theater, dance
halls, and cabarets. See id. Many of these venues became part of regional touring circuits
to which local and regional jazz bands had access. See id. at 54.
193
See CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 476.
194
PERETTI, supra note 68, at 148 (“Black players found, as Earl Hines put it, that
‘whites [in the 1920s] began to realize the talent Negroes had, and they began scheming
how to commercialize it.’” (alteration in original)).
195
Id.
188
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nickname among Blacks “Tough on Black Artists/Asses.”196
Promoters (and some band leaders) rarely paid royalties and
routinely stole original works.197 Record companies usually paid
flat fees to instrumentalists.198 Only the most popular songs were
paid royalties.199 Rooted in the folk traditions of the rural South,
many musicians were unacquainted with the idea of individual
authorship and royalty rights.200 Some musicians who were
savvier took advantage of their band mates by taking credit for the
entire composition even though it was collaboration.201
Of course, critical to the success of the genre was wide
acceptance by white audiences,202 yet legal segregation and the real
or perceived antipathy for black musicians severely circumscribed
opportunities for black jazz artists.203 Thus, a critical pattern
196

Id. (noting that TOBA used black musicians extensively in its touring shows of the
twenties but paid poor wages and enforced discriminatory policies).
197
See id. at 150 (noting that one Tin Pan Alley copyist had a room filled with Benny
Carter arrangements that he went around and sold, to which Carter responded: “He’s such
a nice man that [I] figured, ‘well, if he’s making a couple of bucks, what the heck, you
know.’”). Many musicians gained royalties only after legal proceedings, as stories of
these unfair practices led musicians to become more careful and litigious. See id.
198
See id. at 148, 153 (“Record company agents did not always pay musicians as they
promised, and written record contracts were rarely drawn up. . . . Record companies kept
artist payments as low as possible to maintain their profit margins. Instrumentalists were
usually paid flat fees (ranging from $30 to $75) for making both sides of a 78-rpm disk,
and they never obtained royalties.”).
199
See id. at 149 (“[T]he American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP), founded in 1914, had begun to ensure that at least the best-selling song
composers would get their royalties.”).
200
See id. at 149–50.
201
See id. at 150 (noting many bands worked out compositions together, but a band
leader who was aware of ASCAP and the concept of royalties could take credit). Duke
Ellington was called out for just such a thing and responded by saying “everybody else
steals from me.” Id. Ellington would pay small sums for ideas but would not allow the
originator to share in the large royalties. Id. One frustrated band mate even said, “I don’t
consider you a composer. You are a compiler.” Id.
202
See COLLIER, supra note 182, at 12–14 (“It is critical to our understanding of early
jazz and American culture to recognize that by far the largest proportion of the American
audience for the music consisted of mainstream whites drawn from the whole spectrum
of society, from the upper crust looking for new thrills down to working people paying a
nickel a dance in the jitney dance halls. . . . Jazz could not have survived as anything but
a tiny local music had it been forced to depend mainly on finding a black audience. From
the beginning it was the white audience that provided the economic base for it.”).
203
For instance, the Chicago Federation of Musicians—led by Mobsters—was a
whites-only union that commanded the highest wages. PERETTI, supra note 68, at 157–58.
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begun during the minstrel era continued: Black musical genres and
styles were appropriated as property by white composers,
publishers, and promoters, then altered to more closely fit expected
white consumer tastes and sold.204 In the early jazz period, this
was demonstrated most clearly in the difference between “hot”
jazz and “sweet” jazz.205
The major record companies of the time included Victor, RCA,
and Columbia.206 Many of the jazz bands that were recording on a
regular basis were made up of white musicians, who tended to play
in the “sweet” jazz style.207 While black bands were often denied
opportunities to record, the style of jazz played also dictated the
recording opportunities black bands had.208 During the first decade
of recording, from 1918 to the late 1920s, the sweet jazz band
dominated the popular music scene, both in the clubs and the
recording studios.209 Large audiences remained for the hot jazz
sound associated with black jazz bands,210 but recording
companies and promoters alike focused on the sweet jazz sound.211
Booking shows at hotels and clubs that denied access to blacks further diminished the
opportunities for black performers. See Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 152.
204
See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 186–87.
205
See id. at 154.
206
Chris Morris, A History of Independent Labels, BILLBOARD, Nov. 1, 1994, at 131
(noting that when recording became a big part of the industry, it was dominated by the
majors, which, generally speaking, would dominate the music market place until the late
forties and early fifties).
207
Peretti describes that style as follows: “This music syncopated mildly, rarely used
the blues or swung, and it almost never stressed improvisation, and so it is rarely
considered part of the great jazz tradition.” PERETTI, supra note 68, at 94.
208
See id. at 201–02.
209
See COLLIER, supra note 191, at 17–18 (describing how in the early twenties,
symphonic sweet Jazz began to push out the hot jazz of black bands, dominating the field
for several years and making many rich).
By 1922 Vincent Lopez was commanding $5,000 a week for his
orchestra . . . and Whiteman himself was paying his star clarinetist,
Ross Gorman[,] . . . an astounding $400 a week. . . . [M]usicians in
the better-known orchestras were earning from $75 to $300 a week.
By 1925 . . . [the] top bands [in New York] were being paid $10,000
a week.
Id. White bands almost exclusively played for white audiences. Id. at 22.
210
See id. at 20, 22 (noting that “[b]y 1930 Duke Ellington was Victor’s second best
seller” and that by 1931, Louis Armstrong had sold over 100,000 records).
211
See id. at 19–22 (noting that, during the twenties, when the orchestra band was the
most popular but the “hot” jazz band was still around, music trade magazines paid more
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The pattern of racial exclusion and appropriation continued
into the swing era, well into the forties,212 when, except for a few
of the most popular black-lead jazz bands, black musicians,213 and
the music associated with them, were not heard on radio.214
“Consequently, to the broader White public, swing did not appear
to be Black music. This perception was reinforced by Jim Crow
barriers that kept African-American bands from being heard
through the same high-visibility broadcast channels.”215 Even in
modern jazz, as artists like Ornette Coleman and black intellectuals

attention to the orchestra type band; however, in Variety, popular white “hot” bands were
listed but not any similarly popular black “hot” bands).
To be sure, there were independent labels that dedicated their resources to recording
and promoting the hot jazz sound during this period. See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 149
(“Jack Kapp became a powerful benefactor to jazz when he wholly dedicated his
successful American Decca company to popular dance music, [but] he nevertheless hurt
the music by diluting it in the recording studio, simplifying melodic lines and eliminating
much improvisation.”). The recording business was one wrought with financial
difficulties and uncertainties. See id. at 153. Often, the independent labels could not
sustain themselves long, and larger record companies would buy these struggling
companies. See id.
In addition, unscrupulous treatment by managers exploited the vulnerability of black
musicians—many of them illiterate or not formally trained musically—to convert
ownership of their work. See id. at 147–50. Professional managers took liberties with
their artists’ creations. See id. at 147–48. For example, Irving Mills, a singer/songwriter
who managed Duke Ellington’s band, took partial credit for many Duke Ellington
compositions to which he did not contribute. Id. at 148. Also, “Paddy” Harmon, an
owner of Chicago’s Dreamland Café, took credit for inventing a trumpet mute that Joe
“King” Oliver and other black musicians had been using for decades. Id.
212
See COHN, supra note 181, at 9–13. After the war, economics (the war) forced
bands to assemble in smaller groups. See id. at 10. But this also prolonged the popularity
of the big band since record companies were not promoting the small band style during
the interwar period. See id.
213
See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 154 (noting “sweet” dance bands dominated radio
(mostly white) in 1930s to the detriment of “hot” jazz bands (mostly black)).
214
DAVID P. SZATMARY, ROCKIN’ IN TIME: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ROCK-AND-ROLL 19–
20 (1987) (quoting Johnny Otis, who argued that “in the thirties and forties, black music
was summarily cut off the radio”).
215
Id. The radio jobs that were available to black musicians were not desirable from an
artistic standpoint because the musicians could not control the musical content. See
PERETTI, supra note 68, at 162 (“The radio network jobs were the best paying in the jazz
world, but they were few in number and fell often to those who were the most willing to
let producers dictate their musical expression.”). It became clear that musical production
would be dictated by radio and record company executives’ determination of what style
would sell; to them, the more “commercialized” the music, the better. See id. at 156.
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like Harold Cruse would attest in the late-1960s,216 jazz was
typically a tough business for jazz authors. Whether recording or
performance, the incentives to create that copyright ownership
theoretically promotes had to come mainly from some other
source.
2. Rock and Roll & Rhythm and Blues
The pattern of racial appropriation—black music artists
developing a musical genre controlled first by white business
intermediaries then by creative imitators, and black economic
disenfranchisement from the financial gains of the music industry
they helped to build and dispossession of ownership in original
works of authorship and performance—continued after World War
II and into the vast increase in popularity of recorded music on
vinyl records.217 Rock and roll in its popular form emerged around
1955–56.218 Major record labels could no longer deny the
popularity of Rhythm & Blues (“R&B”) music, but they eschewed
its black creators.219 As a result, major labels attempted to record
216

According to Cruse, beneath even the failure to award Duke Ellington the Pulitzer
Prize, everything is appropriative harm. HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO
INTELLECTUAL 110–11 (N.Y. Review of Books 2005) (1967). The prize itself is not
really that important, but what lies behind the denial of the prize, is:
a whole history of organized duplicity and exploitation of the Negro
jazz artist—the complicated tie-in between booking agencies, the
musicians’ unions, the recording companies, the music publishers,
the managers, the agents, the theater owners, the nightclub owners,
the crooks, shysters, and racketeers. The Negro creative intellectuals
have to look into the question of how it is possible for a Negro jazz
musician to walk the streets of large cities, jobless and starving, while
a record that he cut with a music company is selling well, both in the
United States and in Europe. They have to examine why a Negro
jazz musician can be forced to pay dues to unions that get him no
work, and that operate with the same discriminatory practices as
clubs, halls and theaters. The impact of the cultural tradition of AfroAmerican folk music demands that the racially corrupt practices of
the music-publishing field be investigated.
Id.
217
See Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 245–46.
218
Arnold Shaw, Researching Rhythm & Blues, 1 BLACK MUSIC RES. J. 71, 74 (1980)
(“Chronologically, the R & B era embraces the 1940s and early 1950s, whereas rock ’n’
roll emerges in 1955–56.”).
219
See id. at 71 (noting Rock emerged as a direct result of R&B in the early ’50s).
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white men with a black sound.220 A more up-tempo version of
R&B with elements of soul music, “rock and roll”—a black
vernacular term describing sexual relations—was being played by
black musicians since the late forties.221 To obfuscate the source
of the R&B music from which rock and roll developed, popular
radio DJs such as Alan Freed used the term “rock & roll.”222 Rock
emerged as a symbol of white teenage aggression and a rebellion
from the manners and the music of their parents.223
R&B, on the other hand, officially emerged as a distinct genre
in the music industry in 1949 when Billboard provided a separate
chart for the music.224 Up to that point all music created by black
artists for black listeners was grouped under the designation “race”
record.225
However, R&B, as it came to be defined musically, was being
played since the early 1940s.226 At that time, jazz had experienced
a temporary decline as a performance art.227 World War II led to
fewer men in the country; band personnel were unstable, and
ballrooms closed.228 Smaller bands were formed to play smaller
venues; these bands developed new musical repertoires,
specifically bebop and R&B.229 The creators of these new
repertoires were former jazz and blues musicians who joined
together.230 The styles were adopted by young adults raised in

220

See id. at 72.
See SZATMARY, supra note 214, at 15–19 (noting Little Richard and Chuck Berry
were the first established “rock and roll” artists, a term used by blacks for sex and first
used to describe all R&B artists).
222
COHN, supra note 181, at 13.
223
See id. at 14–15 (noting teens had money and needed things to spend it on, which
created a market for all things teen, especially music).
224
Matthew A. Killmeier, Race Music, ST. JAMES ENCYC. OF POP & CULTURE, Jan. 29,
2002, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_g1epc/is_tov/ai_2419101005/ (noting that the
term “R&B” was first used by Billboard in 1949, replacing the use of “race” to describe
black music by black artists).
225
See Greene, “Copynorms,” supra note 19, at 1189–90.
226
See Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 255 (noting that the Orioles were
formed in 1946 and are considered the first rhythm and blues vocal harmony group).
227
See id. at 248.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
221
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impoverished urban environments whose musical influences came
out of black church music, such as jubilee and gospel.231
On the business side, R&B was primarily produced by small
independent record labels and grew as a result of longstanding
industry conflicts.232 Independent record labels recognized the
market potential for R&B because of its popularity among
teenagers, and further because of the fact that major labels still did
not want to record or market to blacks, a situation that had
persisted since the dawn of the swing era.233 They aggressively
sought R&B acts.234 With the major recording companies ignoring
the R&B market, along with the availability of independent
pressing plants, many independent labels entered the music
business.235 At the same time, the National Association of
Broadcasters formed its own performing artists’ organization,
Broadcast Music Incorporated (“BMI”), ending ASCAP’s virtual
monopoly, creating “a cultural space for [R&B] artists.”236
R&B then entered the mainstream through radio, specifically
independent radio,237 where it became fodder for imitation and
appropriation. The advent of television had devastated network
radio and spawned the growth of independent stations needing to
appeal to their own audiences.238 R&B discs were banned at white
231

Id.
See Killmeier, supra note 224.
233
Id.
234
Chris Morris has noted: “In the 10-year period following the end of World War II, a
group of fast-moving indie labels keenly read the barometer of mass taste and issued
music by groups and artists who would virtually define the currents of popular music
through the first rock’n’roll era.” Morris, supra note 206, at 132. Thus, for the first time
independent labels were in control of popular music.
235
Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 399.
236
Id. at 398. But radio listeners might no longer have access to ASCAP songs. Id.
While ASCAP’s members included the industry catalogues for Broadway and film, BMI
turned to the songwriters themselves for membership. Id. “This move signaled a new era
in Black popular music in the sense that ASCAP, and its considerable influence in
shaping public taste, was challenged publicly for the first time, creating a cultural space
for [R&B] artists.” Id.
237
See SZATMARY, supra note 214, at 19. Television made radio space available to
more recording artists. Id. It was curtailed during the war but became more popular and
affordable after. By absorbing the network radio shows (all white), television allowed
radio to be more available to black artists. Id.
238
Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 399.
232
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stations, which contributed to artists’ rampant covering in 1955–
56.239 Labels recorded covers of the music with white groups and
changed the arrangements to make it more palatable for radio and
mainstream America.240 Only after teens began to demand the
genuine source did major recording companies begin to record
black artists.241
Yet the practice of “racial covers” reveals how explicit
statutory provisions worked against black R&B artists.242 Without
the ability to make white covers of black songs under the Act’s
compulsory license mechanism,243 the industry would have had to
alter its racist behavior sooner—playing black artists on white
stations, signing black R&B artists to major labels, and expanding
the opportunities for popular and financial recognition for black
musical authors.244

239

COHN, supra note 181, at 13.
Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 246.
241
See id. at 246–47 (“With few exceptions and adhering to the social practices of a
segregated society, record labels initially promoted these groups exclusively in African
American communities.”); see also id. at 262 (“[R]hythm and blues remained popular
among White youth. Record labels, eager to cater to the musical tastes of this group,
pondered new and noncontroversial strategies to market this music across racial, class,
and generational lines.”).
242
As R&B and rock artist Bo Diddley said of the effect of covers on his career as an
innovator: “With me, there had to be a copy. . . . They wouldn’t buy me, but they would
buy a white copy of me. Elvis got me. I don’t even like to talk about it.” SZATMARY,
supra note 214, at 25.
243
See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976).
244
See Neela Kartha, Comment, Digital Sampling and Copyright Law in a Social
Context: No More Colorblindness!!, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 218, 224–28
(1997) (arguing that the compulsory license provision of the Copyright Act disempowers
African-American music artists). Interestingly, at the same time the practice of racial
covers was occurring, in its 1961 report, the Register of Copyrights recommended to
Congress a sweeping revision of the Copyright Act that would eliminate the compulsory
licensing provision entirely. See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted
in 6 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1, 717 (George S. Grossman
ed., 2001).
The report reiterates the record industry’s main arguments against the elimination of
the compulsory license. According to the Recording Industry Association of America
(“RIAA”): (1) a variety of recordings of a musical work are beneficial to the public, and
without a compulsory license, music publishers/composers would grant exclusive
licenses that would prevent this; (2) compulsory licenses enable smaller record
companies to exploit the same music as larger ones, and thus stay in business; and (3)
240
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On the back of rock, the record industry experienced enormous
growth during this time period, increasing sales three-fold by the
end of the 1950s.245 Independent labels reaped most of these early
rewards,246 as the major labels avoided recording this music.247
Many majors responded by attempting to buy the smaller
independent labels or individual artists.248
The exploitation of black artists during the period of R&B’s
rise in popularity is now the stuff of legend and litigation. For
instance, Chuck Berry successfully sued the Beach Boys for

music publishers and composers actually benefit from the multiplicity of records. Id. at
714.
The rejoinders by the Register are also noteworthy. First, even without compulsory
licenses, music publishers and composers would probably still issue multiple licenses
anyway, but with the added benefit that they could refuse licenses to irresponsible or
undesirable recordings. Id. at 715. Second, even if music publishers and composers were
to issue more exclusive licenses, this might be beneficial because record companies
would then be forced to take on more new music. Id. In other words, while variety in the
number of recordings of one work may be sacrificed, the offset is the variety of the actual
works recorded. Third, while it is true that under the present scheme, smaller companies
can make competing renditions of a song by a bigger company, if a smaller company
were to have exclusive licenses, and if the smaller company is lucky to have taken on a
song that turns out to be a hit (the idea is that you never know what’s going to be a “hit”),
they would not have competition from larger companies. Id. at 715–16.
The thrust of the Register’s arguments go to concerns about the integrity (nondistortion) of a song with “bad” covers—a moral rights-type interest. The RIAA’s thrust
goes to free access concerns. Both positions have merit. However, neither addressed the
widespread practice of racial covers, though both certainly could have included the issue
within the framework of their arguments.
245
See SZATMARY, supra note 214, at 54 (“Record sales went from 189 million in 1950
to almost 600 million by the end of the decade.”).
246
See Morris, supra note 206, at 132 (“The indies gained substantially in this
rock’n’roll gold rush: According to a breakdown of top 10 singles on Billboard’s charts
by rock historian Charlie Gillett, indies accounted for 59 of the 89 top 10 records in 1959,
as opposed to only 11 of 51 entries in 1955.”).
247
See id. at 131–32 (“The reasons for the upswing in the indie trade were numerous . .
. [and indie labels] were more than happy to cater to the niche tastes of audiences that
were not being served by the major labels’ pop-skewed artists.”).
248
See id. at 136 (“Consolidation became a byword in the record industry once more
during the ’60s. Two formidable New York indies with storied catalogs—Elektra
Records, the folk-based imprint founded in 1950 by Jac Holzman, and Atlantic Records,
started up in 1948 by Herb Abramson and Ahmet Ertegun, were both acquired by
National Kinney Corp. in the late ’60s, becoming . . . the industry’s market-share leader
in the ’90s, the Warner Music Group.”).
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copyright infringement of his compositions.249 Muddy Waters
settled with Led Zeppelin for the expropriation of his work.250
Many lesser known artists were not as successful in ever
vindicating their rights as authors and performers.251 The financial
losses, as discussed in the last Part, constitute staggering harms
when compared to the future value of so much of the era’s music.
However, the appropriative harm to personality in the theft of song
and style and the lost opportunities that routinely resulted from
common business models represents a defining characteristic of
risks to music authors even in the later part of the twentieth
century.
3. Soul Music
Soul was the new popular black music of the 1960s,252
representing an altered black vernacular that combined the
urbanization of black culture with so many of the rural, Southern,
and gospel influences of the past.253 On the business side, the
launch of soul music’s Motown Records by Berry Gordy in 1959
marked a new epoch as the crystallization of many of the creative
and business trends described thus far.254 Yet Motown also
represented features of black musical experience we have already
seen: the dialectic of self-disguise and white mimicry;255 the
requirement of suiting white tastes;256 and artistic innovation for
the sake of a competitive advantage amid the chronic market
failure of industry racism.257 What was different, however, was
the successful emergence of black entrepreneurship on a grand
scale. It soon became the largest black-owned corporation in the
249

Alan Korn, Renaming That Tune: Aural Collage, Parody and Fair Use, 22 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 321, 341 n.106 (1992).
250
Aoki, supra note 19, at 763–64.
251
See Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 353–54 (noting
that even after the 1909 Copyright Act, lesser known African American artists frequently
had original work misappropriated by non-creators).
252
Candace G. Hines, Black Musical Traditions and Copyright Law: Historical
Tensions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 463, 485 n.159 (2005).
253
See COHN, supra note 181, at 127.
254
See id. at 134–36.
255
See Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 372–73.
256
See Gitelman, supra note 107, at 148.
257
See supra Part II.C.1.
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country.258 Gordy combined talent management, producing,
recording, and publishing.259
Soul music also represents the era in which a convergence of
artistic stardom (personality) and business acumen (control) started
to take the form of a more assertive consciousness about ownership
rights. James Brown was one of the first artists to control his
career, forming his own production company and getting a
percentage of his performances.260 When his record label refused
to finance a recording of a live show at the Apollo, he financed it
himself.261 Sam Cooke, Curtis Mayfield, and Ray Charles, along
with Brown, represented the handful of artists that were able to
control their careers from an artistic and financial standpoint.262
Nonetheless, they were the exception. Although this was the era in
which artists were increasingly autonomous as writers and
performers, there was still a general lack of appreciation for
owning intellectual property rights. Record companies, even
black-owned companies such as Motown, continued to keep the
lion’s share of the ownership rights and profits.263
Finally, soul music may represent the point at which a whitedominated music industry began to re-examine the principle of

258

See Kenneth Meeks, Berry Gordy: America’s First Black Music Mogul: The
Architect of the Motown Sound Ushered in a New Era of Music, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Oct.
2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1365/is_3_36/ai_n15679382/.
259
See id.
260
See COHN, supra note 181, at 129.
261
Id.
262
See Gail Mitchell, Black Artists Struggle to Regain Ownership of Master
Recordings, BILLBOARD, Mar. 2, 2002, at 89 (“Precedents for attaining control were set
by such farsighted artist/businessmen as Cooke, [Ray] Charles, and Mayfield. A handful
of white acts is also part of that select group, including country major leaguers Buck
Owens and Kenny Rogers and ’50s and ’60s-era acts the Four Seasons (the group’s
VeeJay and Philips material), Paul Anka, and Fats Domino (their ABC-Paramount
material).”).
263
See Debbie Snook, That MOTOWN Magic: The People, Hits That Launched a
Revolution in Black Music, PLAIN DEALER, July 16, 1995, at 1J (“The Jacksons’ initial
contract with Motown was for a 2.7 percent royalty rate, ‘better than previous deals,’
writes Nelson George, ‘but hardly generous in an era when royalty rates were often 8
percent.’”); see also Mitchell, supra note 262, at 89 (“‘At Vee-Jay, there was no money,’
recalls Michael McGill of the Dells, whose first R&B chart hit was 1956’s ‘Oh What a
Nite.’ ‘[Vee-Jay] would tell us, You make your money on the road. The records are just
to promote you.’”).
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racially segregated tastes from a business perspective. It was the
occasion, in 1971, for a now-famous report that Columbia Records
Group commissioned researchers at the Harvard Business School
to conduct.264 The report’s findings presage a changed, but still
racially ambivalent, attitude toward black music and musicians’
rights after the addition of sound recording rights in 1972265 and
the wholesale amendment of the copyright act in 1976:266
Soul music is one of the very few basic art forms
which is indigenous to America, although its roots
may be traced to Africa. It has been and probably
will continue to be a vital and influential force on
contemporary popular music. And soul is by no
means a static music form. It too will continue to
change. Companies able to work successfully in
this art form will be in a position to relate more
dynamically to its impact on other forms of popular
music, such as pop and rock. This will be
especially important as these three music styles
converge upon one another.267
III. THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT AND THE EFFECT OF HIP-HOP AND
INDIE ENTREPRENEURS
The 1976 amended Copyright Act had tremendous potential to
benefit musical artists—especially performers—who, in 1972,
264

The “Harvard Report,” as it is known, is not publicly available, but numerous
writers have seen it and commented on its contents. See, e.g., Yvonne Bynoe, Money,
Power, and Respect: A Critique of the Business of Rap Music, in R&B (RHYTHM AND
BUSINESS): THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC 200, 204 (Norman Kelley ed.,
2005). Bynoe summarized the findings as follows: soul music has a broad appeal;
cultivating black radio was important; black music consumers are a key test audience;
and whites in the industry were too removed from black music. Id. It recommended that
CRG develop black personnel in-house. Id.
265
See Emily F. Evitt, Money, That’s What I Want: The Long and Winding Road to a
Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 10
(2009).
266
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; see also Evitt, supra
note 265, at 10.
267
Bynoe, supra note 264, at 205 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting the Harvard
Report).
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nominally received for the first time rights in their sound
recordings.268 Specifically, the 1976 Act now reduced the
formalities for copyright ownership,269 extended the term to the
author’s life plus seventy years,270 created compulsory licensing
mechanisms that facilitate wider performance of musical
compositions;271 and finally codified a right in public performances
for sound recordings.272 The Act made copyright’s bundle of
rights divisible273 and added a right of termination of transfers after
thirty-five years.274 Its limitations and exceptions are substantial,
including the express adoption of fair use275 and provisions
limiting an artist’s say in the use of her work by cable broadcasters
and satellite carriers.276
However, the limitations on performance rights in sound
recordings may be the most telling in terms of the imbalance of
power between artists and intermediaries. The new right was
narrowly drawn to permit claims for infringement only when nontrivial amounts of the actual recording were reproduced without
permission.277 The same is true for the sound recording artist’s
derivative right, which, unlike the composer’s right to prevent
substantially similar adaptations, is only triggered by an exact
duplication.278 Lastly, the sound recording artist has no exclusive

268

Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (2006)).
269
Compare Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544–
45 (1976) (providing that copyright attaches upon fixation in a tangible medium of
expression), with Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 10, 30 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed
1976) (providing that copyright attaches upon publication and notice).
270
17 U.S.C. § 302.
271
Id. §§ 115, 801–03.
272
Id. § 106.
273
Id. § 201.
274
Id. § 203.
275
Id. § 107.
276
Id. § 111.
277
Id. § 114(b).
278
Id.
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right in public performance—only the composer279 (usually half
music publisher) does.280
A. The 1976 Act: Resistance, Entrepreneurism and
Conglomeration
Most observations about what the artist could or couldn’t have
under the 1976 Act are academic, because the standard recording
contract includes an assignment of all the recording artist’s rights
in the work.281 In fact, the standard record deal is more like a
personal services employment agreement under which the creative
artist’s efforts are expressly made a work-for-hire.282 The record
label is, in most cases, the legal “author.”283
It is important to note that the 1976 Act was passed during a
period in which albums (“LP”s), rather than singles, were
dominant in recorded music, and recording, marketing, and
distribution costs for a completed album were substantial.284 The
sheer number of technical contributors to the finished work in
some ways justified a greater degree of control over the work by
the party making the greatest capital investment—the record
company.285 However, it is by no means clear that the labels had
to take as much as they did. The facts show artists at a tremendous
disadvantage, notwithstanding provisions in the new Act to the
contrary.286
Nor is it clear why the Act’s structure so easily allowed noncreative interests to own creative rights. The termination clause

279

Id. § 114(a).
See generally WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SYDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC:
THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 133–
52 (10th ed. 2007).
281
See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 105–06 (2d ed. 1996)
(providing the typical grant of rights provision in most recording contracts).
282
Cf. id. at 413.
283
Id.
284
See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 280, at 33.
285
Id.
286
See David K. Rehr Delivers Speech at Radio Ink’s Forecast 2008, US FED. NEWS,
Dec. 4, 2007 (“Artists, desperate to ‘make it’ in a very competitive industry, often sign
away their rights to the record label. Before they know it, they owe the label money and
can never get out from under their oppressive control.”).
280
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protects creative artists against irreversibly imprudent assignments
of their rights.287 Its inclusion illustrates that Congress, conscious
of the history of discrimination against musicians and the
disgorgement of the rights in their work, could have enacted a
statutory bar on some valuable ownership transfers by artists.
Arguably, the onus could shift to record labels to secure returns on
investment and profit streams exclusively through contractual
terms rather than to artists, who almost never do. Royalties,
specifically future royalties, could constitute an economic right
alienable only by actual authors and performers of creative works.
(They would probably be negotiated at substantially lower rates,
but at least artists would own the asset for alternative modes of
commercial exploitation.) The legislative history demonstrates
very little Congressional interest in such a regime.288
Not surprisingly, during the last decades of the century record
companies continued to profit enormously from the new rules and
to engage in the same methods of racial appropriation of black
musical authorship.289 What is again evident is the persistence of
racial market segmentation, re-description of black music to satisfy
perceived white consumer preferences and the economic
marginalization of black artists—often in ways that probably
diminished profits—from an industry identified by the public as
more progressive, if not counter-cultural, on social issues.290 This
time, however, the technological changes that have always
influenced recording industry methods and economics would later
provide the realistic possibility of industry transformation. As
we’ll see more specifically in the next Part, the lower production
287

See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006). The Copyright Act’s termination clause permits an
artist to terminate a prior grant of rights after a period of thirty-five years notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary (e.g., a waiver of the right in a recording agreement). Id. §
203(a)(5). Congress predicated the right on “the unequal bargaining position of authors,
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been
exploited.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). See generally NIMMER, supra note 28,
§ 11.01–02.
288
See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 280, at 10–12.
289
See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 148; see also Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black
Music, supra note 16, at 353–54.
290
See James L. Tyson, Ad Agencies Walk Fine Line in Tapping Inner City Trends,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 27, 1996, at 8 (noting that pop radio stations in the 1970s
hid black music behind the tag “urban contemporary music”).
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costs and more democratic distribution infrastructure possible
through the Internet would permit musical artists themselves to
recapture the legal rights in their work and the economic benefits
of exploiting them.291
1. The 1970s and ’80s
The music business changed a great deal in the 1970s. Singles
had driven the popular music industry for the previous two
decades.292 Economically, this allowed independent labels to
compete with the major labels and for mainstream market
penetration by black soul and R&B artists.293 However, albums
became more popular in the 1970s, increasing production costs.294
Independent labels, where most black artists recorded, were not
able to compete as readily as before.295 In fact, the “’70s were
largely quiet times for the indies, as the music dismissively known
as ‘corporate rock,’ and later disco, reigned supreme on the
charts.”296 Independent labels—albeit in a different form and
role—made a comeback only after the popularity gains by rap
music.297 Notably, during the seventies, many more artists sought
291

See infra Part IV.
See Jack Egan, Pop Records Go Boom, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 31, 1983, at 56–57 (noting
that singles dominated the music industry in the ’50s and ’60s).
293
See Morris, supra note 206, at 132 (“A network of independent distributors catering
to retailers and jukebox operators stocking independent labels’ product has also begun to
spring up.”).
294
See Rudy’s Corner, Singles vs. Albums (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.rudyscorner.
com/88/singles-vs-albums.html.
295
JAMES HASKINS, BLACK MUSIC IN AMERICA 161–62 (1987) (noting black music was
not the popular music of the ’70s and ’80s, although disco and funk were around).
A major reason, however, was changes in the record business itself.
Once albums became more popular than singles, production costs
soared, and small, independent labels like the kind Motown had once
been could not compete with the major labels. One week in the
summer of 1984, ninety-nine of the records on the Billboard Hot 100
were recorded on major labels.
Id. Since many blacks recorded on independent labels, this trend was bound to affect
them. Id. Even blacks who did record for major labels found that they did not get as
much promotion as white stars who recorded for the same labels. Id.
296
Morris, supra note 206, at 134–35.
297
See id. (“By the mid-’70s, rap music had begun its rise out of the New York clubs;
significant single releases by such acts as the Sugar Hill Gang, Grandmaster Flash & the
Furious Five, and Afrika Bambaata & Soulsonic Force appeared on such labels as Sugar
292
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to control their intellectual property rights.298 Not only were they
demanding their fair share, they were also creating their own
companies to manage, promote, and distribute their musical
work.299 This upsurge in artist-owned distribution companies
coincided with the establishment of black music departments by
major labels.300
By the early eighties, the majors focused on the singlesuperstar format, many of whom were African American.301 Those
artists who had reached the heights of Michael Jackson and Lionel
Richie were promoted as pop acts.302 While more marketing
dollars were pushed their way, the artists lost much artistic and
managerial freedom with their new position.303 Pop music was
also affected by the emergence of music videos, an important
predictor of success,304 and the social beliefs behind another
intermediary—MTV—beginning in 1981.305 In the first few years
of video, black artists were categorically denied opportunities to

Hill and Tommy Boy. Within a decade’s time, the genre would experience its first
platinum hit album, Run-D.M.C.’s ‘Raising Hell,’ issued by another New York indie,
Profile.”).
298
See J.R. Reynolds, Study Recommends Changes in the Black Music Industry,
BILLBOARD, June 1, 1996, at 24.
299
See id. (describing the successful upstart of Motown).
300
See id. (“In 1971, CBS Records commissioned from Harvard a feasibility study that
led to the creation of the label’s black music department, which was the first in the
industry.”). Further, the study revealed that CBS record executives “were pleasantly
surprised at just how together the organizations” they studied were. Id.
301
Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 409 (noting when the music industry came
out of the early ’80s recession, the major labels focused more on the single superstar
format, fueled by the worldwide success of Michael Jackson’s “Thriller”; many of these
superstars were African American).
302
See id.
303
Id. (noting that big-time artists who were promoted directly under major labels’ pop
divisions were forced to give up the management, attorneys, etc., who started their
careers; only a few major artists were able to maintain black management).
304
But see Brian C. Drobnik, Truckin’ in Style Along the Avenue: How the Grateful
Dead Turned Alternative Business and Legal Strategies into a Great American Business
Story, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 242, 247 n.67 (citing interview with Steve Popovich,
CEO, Cleveland International Records) (noting the music video has diminished the
importance of radio as a form of promotion and that trends in radio play follows those in
television play).
305
See Havelock Nelson, R&B Extremes Flare in the ’80s: Rap, Hip-Hop Exacerbate
Generation Gap, BILLBOARD, Feb. 18, 1995, at 20.
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appear on MTV.306 Michael Jackson was the first black artist to
appear on MTV with his music video for the song “Beat It.”307 In
1982, Tina Turner became the first black woman to appear on
MTV.308 Once again, their success demonstrated that white
audiences would pay directly for black musical entertainment.
2. Hip-Hop Entrepreneurs
It was neither the Copyright Act of 1976 nor the surge in the
profitability of pop music that produced a major crack in the
edifice of corporate ownership over musical works, but the
defiance and independence of schoolyard rap music. Rap and hiphop music did not remain independent throughout, as I discuss just
below. Yet their origins demonstrate a fierce entrepreneurism that
reflected both knowledge of the exploitative practices of the music
industry and a creative opportunism that resulted from social
separation, access to cheap technology, and a creative intuition to
break with pop conventions.309 Rap’s rising popularity during the
eighties spurred the comeback of independent labels,310 such as
Def Jam and Priority Records.311 Artist-owned entrepreneurial
efforts also started to become more prevalent during the late
eighties, as evidenced by rapper Luke Skywalker of 2 Live Crew
306

Id. (“‘When it first started airing [on MTV], [black artists] weren’t even allowed,’ he
says. ‘So people started adjusting their music to fit the format.’ All of a sudden, he says,
executives ‘at record labels started telling writers this or that’s too black.’” (quoting
songwriter and producer James Mtume)). Thus, as in the early days of R&B, executives
were trying to tone down black music to fit a white audience attracted to MTV. Id. MTV
refused to let black acts on so the execs assumed that its growing popularity required
them to mirror their music to the station’s playlist. Id.
307
David Bauder, You Say It’s Your Birthday? MTV’s Turning Today, but You
Wouldn’t Know It by Watching, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug 1, 2006, at D1.
308
HASKINS, supra note 295, at 165.
309
Hip-hop started as a social movement in the South Bronx in the 1970s. Burnim &
Maultsby, supra note 183, at 410.
310
See Morris, supra note 206, at 134.
311
Id. at 136 (“Independent success stories have continued to crop up in the pages of
Billboard to the present day. Through the ’80s, rap accounted for some of the indies’
biggest sales tales: Hardcore efforts by such L.A.-based gangsta acts as N.W.A. and its
members Ice Cube and Eazy-E racked up major numbers for the Ruthless and Priority
imprints. Just last year, an independent scored a mega hit with one of the most
ubiquitous rap singles of all time—‘Whoomp! (There It Is)’ by Tag Team, which moved
a staggering 4 million copies for L.A.’s Bellmark Records.”).

C01_TROUTT_3-9-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

428

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/31/2010 1:04 PM

[Vol. 20:373

forming 2 Live Crew Records in 1985,312 and soul artist James
Brown buying a radio station in 1989.313 Despite the initial
reluctance of major record companies to sign artists who proudly
(and sometimes violently) asserted their affiliation with a
marginalized inner city, hip-hop’s signature music, rap, has
consistently been a major economic force in the music industry
since the mid-nineties and is currently the second best-selling
genre of music in the U.S.314
Hip-hop artists, including rappers and hip-hop influenced R&B
acts, have exhibited greater ownership and control interest than
perhaps any genre.315 The trend gained momentum in the early
nineties when popular rap artists increasingly produced records on
their own labels, securing publishing and distribution deals with
the majors.316 These deals became more prevalent throughout the
nineties for three reasons: (1) artists were able to produce the
music they wanted without acceding to pressure from, or
compromising with, a record label, including independent labels
312
Connie Benesch, Taking Care of Business: Enterprising Rappers Cash in on Their
Entrepreneurial Talents, BILLBOARD, Nov. 27, 1993, at 46.
313
LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Radio Regulation: The Effect of a Pro-Localism Agenda on
Black Radio, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 97, 130 (2006).
314
RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2007 CONSUMER PROFILE 1 (2008), available at
http://76.74.24.142/44510E63-7B5E-5F42-DA74-349B51EDCE0F.pdf; see also Paul
Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 983,
992–93 (2004) (describing hip-hop’s influence on consumers); Alan Hughes, Hip-Hop
Economy, BLACK ENTERPRISE, May 2002, at 70; Gail Mitchell, Black-Music’s Historic
Week: Hot 100 Testifies to Mainstreaming of R&B/Hip-Hop, BILLBOARD, Oct. 18, 2003,
at 20.
315
See Marlynn Snyder, Urban Entrepreneurship: Young Mavericks Make Noise with
Their Own Labels, BILLBOARD, June 3, 1995, at 24 (“[Michael] Bivins started in the
industry as a member of multiplatinum teen act New Edition and later formed R&B/hiphop trio Bell Biv Devoe. His relationship with Motown began as a production deal with
his Biv Entertainment, which launched successful careers for Another Bad Creation and
MC Brains. In addition to the Biv 10 label, whose first act is the popular Chicago teen
foursome Subway, Bivins plans to expand his operation with Biv Films and Biv
Clothing.”).
316
See id. (“Many of these mavericks have struck lucrative label deals with the majors
to promote, market and/or distribute their releases. Among these up-and-coming label
heads are 26-year-old Michael Bivins, president/CEO, Biv 10 Records; Marion ‘Suge’
Knight, 29, co-founder/CEO, Death Row Records; Jermaine Dupri, 22, president, So So
Def Recordings; and Sean ‘Puffy’ Combs, 24, president/CEO, Bad Boy Entertainment.
[The four labels are joint ventures with Motown, Interscope/Atlantic, Columbia and
Arista, respectively.]” (alteration in original)).
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owned by businessmen; (2) they saw more money selling fewer
units than they would if they sold more units with a major label;
and (3) majors welcomed them because these deals helped keep the
majors profitable.317
Independent labels have recently played a more complicated
role than previously thought, occupying less the role of more
equitable and streamlined finder of talent and more as a conduit
and sometimes partner to the major labels seeking to reduce
production costs and hoping to avoid paying union wages.318
Cooperating with indies allows majors to circumvent costly union
agreements to which they are signatories, but indies are not.319
Ultimately, hip-hop itself is a complicating genre for a project
like this.
Its “street” origins and almost vernacular
entrepreneurism when establishment companies shunned it is
representative of the blues, jazz, R&B, and soul traditions before

317

See Mitchell, supra note 262, at 90 (“Like KRS-One, one of the more popular ways
that contemporary artists have gained a measure of masters control is through joint
ventures. Such rappers as Master P, the Cash Money Collective, and others were well on
their way to sales success before aligning themselves with major labels for wider
distribution.”). Also, being able to have significant sales as an independent entity attracts
major labels and allows indies to keep most of the control:
“Our sales gave us a lot of weight and pull,” says Cash Money
CEO Ronald Williams, whose label is distributed through Universal.
“We used to hear a lot about the majors—how they take control—and
we didn’t want to go out like that. But it’s going to be a fight right
now for artists to keep their masters. You just have to fight to keep
100% of your company.”
Id.
318
See Michael Roberts, Papa’s Got a Brand-New Bag: Big Music’s Post-Fordist
Regime and the Role of Independent Music Labels, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
BLACK MUSIC, supra note 264, at 24, 26.
319
Independent labels do not typically have contracts with the American Federation of
Musicians (“AFM”). Id. The majors are “signatory” companies with the AFM, and there
are three contracts they have with musicians: the Phonograph Record Labor Agreement
(wage scales and health and pension), the Phonograph Record Trust Agreement, and the
Special Payments Fund (both for AFM members and free public concerts). Id. at 27. The
major may own up to 50% of an indie subcontractor and avoid the union agreements. Id.
at 37–38. Without direct major-indie competition, cooperation has led to equity deals
and joint ventures, ownership sharing, and most vitally, deals over distribution. Id.
Majors have also increased their distribution capacities. Id. Distribution by a major of a
non-union, non-signatory label relieves it of any obligations under the Phonograph
Record Labor Agreement. Id.
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it.320 Its intertextuality—the borrowing of previous works and
integrating them, sometimes transformatively—is also reminiscent
of some of the earliest black musical traditions, though the claims
of theft by sampled but not compensated artists raises legitimate
concern.321 However, it is the character of its entrepreneurial side
that suggests something about the proliferation of economic motive
and a muddier picture of the artist’s personality interest. First,
many hip-hop artists have succeeded in reaping greater financial
gains by garnering extra-musical fame and exploiting it through
merchandising, fashion lines, movie stardom, product endorsement
and other pursuits unrelated to making music.322 Second, hiphop’s enormous “cross-over” appeal to white, suburban
consumers—while putting the lie to the longstanding beliefs by
white music industry executives that white consumers require
sanitized versions of black music genres—reflects the
internalization by black artists of many accumulated harms under
American music copyright.323 More than a century separates hiphop and the participation of black minstrels in a form of music that
involved the imitation through degrading stereotypes of black
personalities, but some parallels are unmistakable.324 As Norman
Kelley writes in a contemporary vein:
To a certain degree, blacks have become the
“accessorized other,” whose culture, through
commodification, can be sampled and discarded, or
used as a reference point for authentification. Even
more pervasive is the economic incentive for young
blacks to act and perform in ways that conform to
white buyers’ concept of “blackness.” Rap music is
supposed to be about “blackness,” as argued by

320

See Nelson, supra note 305, at 20.
See infra text accompanying notes 354–61.
322
See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 314.
323
See Justin D. Ross, Offended? The Rap’s on Me, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2007, at B02,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007
090702048.html (noting the absence of themes that would make suburban white
customers uncomfortable).
324
JOSHUA SEFFINGA, HIP-HOP MEETS MUSIC VIDEO: THE NEW MILLENIUM MINSTREL
SHOW 1, available at http://classweb.gmu.edu/ajryan/nclc375_s04/minstrel2.pdf.
321
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some rappers, yet still plays into a market-based
expectation or interpretation of the term.325
As for the music author’s personality interest, the history since
passage of the 1976 Act demonstrates less pronounced
appropriation of black musicians’ creations as the music industry
relied less on the mechanics of society’s racial caste system to
exploit authors and instead used its increased power to implement
a business model of onerous, though more uniform, contractual
terms.326 Black musical authors functioned less as the miner’s
canary in the world of musical authorship. However, as the
entrepreneurial pursuits of several soul and rap stars demonstrate,
they continued to manifest a transformative aspect of creative
authorship by innovating forms of music that avoided corporate
capture (at first) and by demanding ownership control of their
work.327
B. Epilogue: Summary Elements, Authorship, and Personality
Did changes in the 1976 Act—specifically the addition of
sound recording rights—create more equity for musicians’
interests? Certainly some who benefited from the tremendous
growth and profitability of the industry would say yes. Many
would say no, especially those whose main body of work occurred
before 1978 when the Act became effective. As law professor K.J.
Greene and numerous musicologists have demonstrated, the
economic casualties to black artists covered by this subaltern
history includes more than the routine exploitation that led Greene
to analogize the early music industry to share-cropping.328 As a
result of the expropriative law and practices described earlier in
this Part, many of America’s best-known and appreciated artists
were devastated by the combination of law and practice that

325

Norman Kelley, Notes on the Political Economy of Black Music, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra note 264, at 6, 20.
326
See, e.g., Brian Ward, “All for One, and One for All”: Black Enterprise, Racial
Politics and the Business of Soul, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra
note 264, at 142, 151; see also Bynoe, supra note 264, at 297.
327
But see Dipanitta Basu, A Critical Examination of the Political Economy of the HipHop Industry, in AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 258, 258 (2005).
328
Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 376–77.
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expropriated profits from them. The great minstrel composer
James Bland, ragtime composer Scott Joplin, blues artists W.C.
Handy and Bo Diddley all suffered the theft of significant earnings
for their work.329 Jelly Roll Morton, a founder of jazz, Bessie
Smith, the legendary blues singer, and Big Bill Crudup, one of the
pioneers of rock and roll, all died destitute.330
Under the 1909 Act in particular, a template was established
for appropriating the work of black musicians.331 Together a
variety of distributor-favored means converged against artists,
including copyright formalities that either dispossessed poor,
sometimes illiterate musicians through technical requirements
(e.g., registration),332 doctrinal rules (e.g., idea/expression
dichotomy),333 or specific statutory provisions (e.g., compulsory
licenses for racial covers);334 exploitation and discrimination by
unscrupulous intermediaries such as publishers, club owners and
managers;335 adhesion terms within the standard contracts of
record labels;336 and most importantly, the systematic application
of leverage to divest both composer- and performer-authors of
ownership of the copyrights in their work as either assignments or
works-for-hire (or both).337 Most of these laws and practices—
though not the routine cultural appropriations and artistic
mimicry—would work against all musicians regardless of race.
However, just as important was the capacity for innovative escape
demonstrated by so many black musicians unable to rely solely on
economic incentives to produce work. It is this aspect of the
history that best indicates the character of an artistic personality

329

Greene, “Copynorms,” supra note 19, at 1197.
See id. at 1198; see also Gee v. CBS, 471 F. Supp. 600, 611–12 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
331
See Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 349–53, 376–77.
332
See id. at 353–54.
333
See Greene, “Copynorms,” supra note 19, at 1200.
334
See id. at 1202.
335
See id. at 1204–07.
336
See Sarah Ann Smith, Note, The New York Artists’ Authorship Rights Act: Increased
Protection and Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 168 n.56
(1984).
337
See Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 377.
330
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interest lost in later case law but described by the likes of Hegel
and Radin.338
I have argued that the author’s personality interest in her music
is defined then not only by the presence of certain elements, but
also by the absence of certain others, such as the dignity lost to
exploitation and the corresponding resistance and resourcefulness.
This is not the same thing as infringement, though it is similar,
because infringement analysis always depends on the appropriation
of specific statutory elements339 that may never be reflected in a
standard recording contract or sharp practices that lead to the loss
of leverage and the dispossession of one’s copyright. In both,
there is a taking, but what is taken may be categorically different.
Nor is this necessarily remedied by moral rights. Moral rights also
protect only certain aspects of creative endeavor, and they do so
after the fact (indeed, after the rights may have been fully
transferred).340 Thus, moral rights protect aspects of what may be
missing (absence) but after the author’s exchange of personality
with the world. In the case of either the lack of dignity during
exploitation or the resistance to exploitation within the innovative
escape, the author’s interest is actualized by something different
from, though connected to, economic motive. It is personality,
which has been central to black musical creativity under almost
180 years of American music copyright law, and it is not
susceptible purely to economic analysis.341 Thus, we often
338

See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–78
(1982); William Torrey Harris and the Hegelian Philosophy of Education, http://gyral.
blackshell.com/hegel/hegedu.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) (“Hegelians viewed the
study of art and music in schools as a means of achieving a more perfect union with the
divine, and consequently, a means to ultimate knowledge.”).
339
See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006).
340
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
341
Another way to see this quality of personality is to consider the characterization of
intellectual property goods as non-rivalrous. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 95 (1st ed. 2001). Non-rivalrous
goods are those whose consumption by one does little or nothing to impede, waste or
deplete the consumption by another. Id. at 21. Ideas are often used as the quintessential
non-rivalrous good, and the leap is easily made to their expression. Id. at 95. But all of
this is mainly true when the source of the non-rivalrous good is deemed the state of
nature or the cultural commons. Id. When we instead consider the source of the idea’s
expression, say musically, to be the creativity of a group of trained artists struggling to
compose, arrange and perform a “new” work, it is harder to think of their output—the
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recognize the presence of a personality interest by the kinds of
harms that may be inflicted upon it. Yet finding a remedy for its
trespass in economic terms is not difficult because it is often tied
inextricably to the economics of artistic creation.
In sum, I have argued that the personality interest in music
copyright is reflected in both its presence—the internal motives
that govern persistent, devoted aesthetic production—as well as its
absence—the persistence of real threats to dignity through
exploitation and appropriation by necessary intermediaries, the
features of the law that facilitate control by non-authors and also
what we acknowledge as theft, or the infringement of one’s
investment of self by other artists, the public and others. However,
the personality interest should be elevated from its prior lurking
status and paired with the dominant economic interest. The best
evidence that this dual conception of copyright’s protectable
interests is accurate may be the present, where in recent years
music artists have attempted to draw greater attention to their
routine exploitation as a result of standard record label practices,342
good—as primarily non-rivalrous. Id. Sure, the result will utilize musical conventions
that did not originate with the group, but their work constitutes a version of what most
would acknowledge as a process of “authorship” that draws upon limited creative
resources. WILLIAM MOYLAN, THE ART OF RECORDING: UNDERSTANDING AND CRAFTING
THE MIX vii (2002). Should one artist quit early and exploit the collected work on his
own before the others can stop him, or should a practice recording mistakenly wind up in
the wrong hands and become somebody else’s hit or soundtrack, the profound sense of
loss reflects something that is not fungible or merely economic. The finished work
represents the effective capture of an elusive part of oneself; its re-capture by others—
sometimes permitted and unpermitted—may feel incalculable. This supports on noneconomic grounds the policy of granting injunctive relief in most intellectual property
infringement actions. The notion of irreparable harm clearly goes beyond incalculable
market injury.
342
See, e.g., Courtney Love, Artist Rights and Record Companies: A Letter to Fellow
Recording Artists, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra note 264, at 307,
available at http://www.gerryhemingway.com/piracy2.html. Vocalist Love makes three
points. First, the group interests of recording artists have never been represented; the two
unions that represent some artists for some issues—American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists (“AFTRA”) for vocalists and AFM for non-singers and session
musicians—split the interests. Id. at 307–08. Second, recording artists’ health care and
pension needs are unprotected. Id. Third, recording artists are not paid what they’re
worth—i.e., they receive an inequitable share of the economic value they create. See id.
at 307–10. Many die broke. But see Danny Goldberg, The Ballad of the Mid-Level
Artist, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra note 264, at 81, 83 (“Up until
the 1970s, record companies unquestionably hoarded a disproportionate share of the
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to organize343 and, most importantly, to jettison the traditional
routes to a musical career in favor of efficient, decentralized digital
independence and audience exchange.
However, the foregoing is foundation to the analysis that
follows in which I argue that recognition of the musical author’s
personality interest may support the status quo against proposed
copyright law reform proposals.
Why?
Because digital
technology increasingly destroys the prevailing assumptions about
the nature of rights, power and infringement.
IV. INDEPENDENT AUTHORS AMID INDUSTRY CHANGES AND
PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS
With digital technology, virtually everything that facilitated the
music business as I have described it has changed. The
relationships on which musical authors were dependent for the
production, marketing, and distribution of their “product” are no
longer essential for reaching consumers.344 At the height of record
industry profits in 1999, the estimated cost of producing a typical
pop album could easily exceed $100,000;345 now, most musicians
can purchase the capability to record and press their own tracks for
the cost of a home computer and less than $150 in additional
software and hardware.346 Equally important, the advent of
Apple’s iTunes and a few other music download sites that resolved
a decade of litigation over free music file-sharing over the Internet
has facilitated inexpensive means by which even little-known
artists can market their work to an interested public.347 Numerous
profits, and many artists, especially black artists, didn’t get paid at all. Over the last
several decades, however, as the business grew, a class of lawyers emerged to take
advantage of the record companies’ needs for marketable product, and the deals
themselves have vastly improved for the artists.”).
343
But see Norman Kelley, Blacked Out: Hip-Hop and R&B Artists MIA in Music
Industry Struggle, VILLAGE VOICE, June 11, 2002, at 47 (describing the apparent apathy
among many big hip-hop artists for organized resistance to record label exploitation).
344
See Ku, supra note 6, at 306.
345
See David J. Moser, MP3 Doesn’t Spell the End of Traditional Labels, BILLBOARD,
Aug. 7, 1999, at 4.
346
Ku, supra note 6, at 306.
347
See, e.g., New Service Brings iTunes to Indie Artists, SPIN, Jan. 19, 2006,
http://www.spin.com/articles/new-service-brings-itunes-indie-artists.
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companies such as Amazon.com provide low-cost distribution of
an artist’s physical CD, though scholars like Larry Lessig believe
that digital distribution portends a day when music itself is not
generally owned by consumers but rented when and as needed
through the use of downloads to portable devices.348 For record
companies, many suspect that these developments may mean the
end of business under the existing model of commodification (they
“cannot compete with free”).349 Indeed, they cite the steady
decline in industry revenues, which in 1999 were $14.5 billion, but
by 2007 had dropped to just $10.3 billion.350 For artists, it is as if
technology has birthed a potentially pure system, a state of creative
nature where, like live performances on a festival of stages,
delivery of one’s work to a curious audience is unimpeded by
costly intermediaries.351 For consumers, music through the
Internet has promised to become a digital commons.
A. Developments: Three Thefts Upon Artists
These changes occurred amid a rapid succession of discrete
developments. I will broadly describe them here as three different
kinds of thefts upon the artist, although even from an artist
perspective there is considerable disagreement about that. The
three are artist-to-artist appropriation through “sampling” and
audio collage, consumer-to-artist appropriation through
unauthorized peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing, and the diminished
scope of the artist’s interest as a result of industry conglomeration.
Though the last is a continuation of trends underway for decades,
the first two were made possible by the wide availability of new,
inexpensive digital technology.
First, artist-to-artist appropriation was elevated beyond the
borrowing of conventions and asserted as an art form in its own
348

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 297–98 (2004), available
at http://www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf.
349
But see id. at 302 (citing the examples of cable television and bottled water).
350
RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2007 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTICS 1 (2008),
http://76.74.24.142/81128FFD-028F-282E-1CE5-FDBF16A46388.pdf.
351
TODD LARSON, COMMUNICAST: DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY-PROGRAMMED
WEBCASTING SERVICE 4 (2003), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu
/files/2004-01.pdf.

THE
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right.352 By the mid-1980s digital sampling, the practice of using
excerpts of a recorded track in loops or other forms, became so
inexpensive with digital technology and so commonplace in hiphop (specifically rap music),353 that it provoked considerable
infringement litigation.354
While the issue of sampling is
interesting from the perspective of intertextuality and artistic
appropriation355—this time mainly of black artists by other black
artists—it is the technology that is most relevant to this analysis.
Sampling signaled the looming threat to established recording
industry interests of cheap and accessible digital devices that
radically diminished production costs.356 The record labels
352
See, e.g., NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETTER U AND THE NUMERAL
2, at 21 (1995) (detailing the art of audiocollage and the group’s unsuccessful litigation
with established record labels and music publishers).
353
MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 82.
354
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (sampling by 2
Live Crew of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman”); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F.
Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993) (sampling by C+C Music Factory of Boyd Jarvis’s “The
Music’s Got Me”); Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (sampling by Biz Markie of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone
Again (Naturally)”). The natural defense in almost every one of these cases is fair use.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). For a more fulsome analysis of digital sampling and
copyright litigation, see David M. Morrison, Bridgeport Redux: Digital Sampling and
Audience Recoding, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 75 (2009).
355
I decline to join the debate over the ethics of music sampling or its status as an
independent art form in this Article. However, it is worth noting that pure positions are
impossible in art forms where intertextuality—essentially, cultural sharing—is so
commonplace in the creative process. Artists who borrow through sampling sometimes
justify their work on grounds of inspiration, common traditions or praise, while others
call it unimaginative stealing. What makes the existence of the debate so interesting from
the perspective of this Article is that it emerges as perhaps the first public debate about
intra-racial appropriation by black artists of other black artists (often from different
generations). For more discussion of the odd inconsistencies provoked by the debate, see
Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple: Postmodern Culture and Copyright Law, 11 MEDIA L.
& POL’Y (FALL) 12, 23–29 (2002).
356
Kembrew McLeod provides a fascinating discussion of the economics of sampling.
See MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 77–99. As the business grew, two changes ushered in
more attention to copyrights. The technological change in production costs was brought
about by the drop in the price of digital samplers, id. at 82, and the creation (at the behest
of big record labels) of lawyer and other service providers who would scan the market for
unauthorized sampling. Id. at 89. What the first made easier the other would diminish
through higher costs. Clearance fees for sampling increased dramatically and severely
altered the extent to which hip-hop producers utilized sampling. Id. at 91–93. While the
first of two kinds of licensing fees, publishing licenses, were not typically prohibitive, the
mechanical or master recording licenses could run as high as a flat fee of $100,000 or a
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responded vigorously and, at least where fair use concerns did not
predominate, with great initial success.357 The public and many
commentators, however, began increasingly to point to the
homespun creativity of ordinary people and their digital remixes as
evidence of a more democratic notion of originality.358 The
recording industry’s reaction led to such a complicated and costly
licensing process for the sampling of copyrighted works that a
practice that once threatened to transform popular music has
mostly receded.359
Second, and almost simultaneously, the Internet became a
source for the popular distribution by consumers of copyrighted
works for free—i.e., consumer-to-artist appropriation. Centralized
and decentralized file-sharing attracted enormous consumer
interest and downloading.360 The public’s capture of free music
was greatly assisted by the rapid development of small, efficient,

percentage of royalties. Id. at 91–92. As a result, many hip-hop acts license the
publishing rights, rent live musicians to record the part, then sample that. Id. at 92–93.
357
See Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling
Infringement Cases Are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the
Need for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 541–45 (2006) (surveying cases); see
also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 2004)
(describing how the district court judge was in the process of handling 800 cases, likely
severed from an aggregate complaint, involving sampling).
358
See, e.g., DAVID KUSEK & GERD LEONHARD, THE FUTURE OF MUSIC: MANIFESTO FOR
THE DIGITAL MUSIC REVOLUTION 50 (Susan G. Lindsay ed., 2005) (arguing that musical
creation is a fluid process of building upon prior works and incapable of ownership);
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 117–21 (2001) (discussing blues
influences); Lawrence Lessig, Symposium, W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and
Future of Intermediaries in the Information Age, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 33, 37–38
(describing the broader concept of “remix” as having “extraordinary democratic
potential—changing the freedom to speak by changing the power to speak, making it
different. Not just broadcast democracy, but increasingly a bottom-up democracy. Not
just the New York Times democracy, but blog democracy. Not just the few speaking to
the many, but increasingly peer-to-peer.”).
359
See MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 91–93 (illustrating the prohibitive costs of sampling
and the shift to live musicians instead).
360
MARK LAFFERTY, DIST. COMPUTING INDUS. ASS’N, FTC PUBLIC COMMENT: PEER-TOPEER FILE-SHARING TECHNOLOGY: CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION ISSUES 1
(2004), available at http://ftc.gov/os/comments/p2pfileshare/OL-100012.pdf (pointing
out that P2P file-sharing programs have been downloaded 700 million times, eclipsing
Instant Messaging applications).
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and inexpensive MP3 players, such as Apple’s iPod,361 which
enabled users to download shared music from their computers but
listen to them anywhere—as a generation before them had done
with Sony Walkmen and their own music collections or shared
mixed tapes.362 However, the Napster,363 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,364 and related “piracy” litigations
demonstrated the weight of corporate copyright owners (the major
record labels and film studios) to protect their profits from
unauthorized and unpaid use.365
Finally, industry conglomeration among record companies
altered the expectations between signed artist and labels, in many
cases making it harder for artists to develop unless they were
assured great success early in their contracts.366 The record labels
grew larger and commanded greater market share, having enjoyed
some of their most profitable years just prior to the dissemination
of popular technology that would threaten to supplant them.367
Rather than make serious attempts at acknowledging and
embracing the technology and the cultural preferences it suddenly
liberated, the major labels fought to maintain as much of the brickand-mortar economic infrastructure as they could.368 This was
reflected in the music piracy litigations. It was reflected in the
industry’s success in persuading Congress to grant recordings a

361

See, e.g., 100 Million iPods Sold (Apr. 9, 2007), http://www.apple.com/pr/
library/2007/04/09ipod.html (announcing the sale of the one hundred millionth iPod in
2007).
362
See, e.g., Tom Hormby, The Story Behind the Sony Walkman (Sept. 15, 2006),
http://lowendmac.com/orchard/06/sony-walkman-origin.html.
363
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
364
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
365
See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 110–28 (2004).
366
See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.
367
See, e.g., Not So Fast, Freeloader (July 7, 2007), http://www.lambgoat.com/features/
articles/metal-hardcore-downloading.aspx (“Century Media’s [record label] Vallee
echoes a similar stance, commenting, ‘We really excelled and had our most profitable
years in 2002–2003. As downloading stuff became more prominent, we saw our sales
decrease more and more each year. Now we’re at the point where we realize, how are we
going to combat this?’” (quotation marks omitted)).
368
See id.
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limited public performance right against digital broadcasting.369
Yet it was further reflected in the increased frustration that many
recording artists have with onerous, longstanding industry
practices.370 Even megastar artists such as Prince, Michael
Jackson, and George Michael engaged in very public disputes over
contract terms with their labels;371 most recently, the band
Radiohead experimented with releasing an album itself over the
Internet and allowing fans to pay what they wished for it.372
Smaller artists, especially newer ones, have opted to forego the
terms, overhead, and whims of record companies and produce
themselves over the Internet.373 By the early 2000s there were
only five major record labels left.374 The consolidation of so much
cultural property into the hands of a few multinational interests
finally saw its greatest backlash in music sales, which have
significantly declined.375 We turn now to what this may all mean
for the interest of music authors in the context of music copyright
reform proposals over the Internet. The next section sets forth the
experience of increasingly independent singer-songwriters—
specifically, an actual recording artist named Citizen Cope. The

369
The Digital Performing Rights in Sound Recording Act (“DPRA”) was enacted in
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336, followed by the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860. See also FISHER, supra
note 365, at 93, 102–10.
370
See, e.g., Pay the Band, http://paytheband.blogspot.com/2008/10/zoolights-hoglezoos-annual-musicians.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009), for an example of a blog
devoted to advancing the notion of compensating musicians and exposing common
practices by which they are not.
371
See Norman Kelley, The Politics of Smoke & Mirrors: Music Revolution or a King
on the Loose? Keepin’ It Real, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra note
264, at 293, 296–98.
372
Jon Pareles, Radiohead, Big Enough to Act Like a Baby Band, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2007, at E1.
373
As David Byrne has predicted: “[W]hat we now call a record label could be replaced
by a small company that funnels income and invoices from the various entities and keeps
the accounts in order.” David Byrne, David Byrne’s Survival Strategies for Emerging
Artists—and Megastars, WIRED, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/
music/magazine/16-01/ff_byrne/?currentPage=all.
374
They were AOL Time Warner, Vivendi/Universal, Bertelsman Music Group
(“BMG”), EMI Distribution, and Sony Music. Roberts, supra note 318, at 34–35 (listing
the individual artists therein).
375
See Mark Pytlik, Remix/remodel, MUSIC ADVERTISING, Nov. 1, 2004, at 31.
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final section analyzes that experience against some of those salient
ideas about copyright reform.
B. Independence and the Contemporary Singer-Songwriter,
Citizen Cope
Clarence Greenwood—whose stage name is Citizen Cope—is
an independent singer-songwriter, preparing to release his fourth
LP/CD in 2010.376 His career exemplifies many of the more recent
developments in recorded music, including dissatisfaction with
major labels and music publishers, dependence on performance for
revenues, a strong inclination to own and control his own
copyrights and finally a decision to become independent.377 He
recorded his first album with Dreamworks in 2002378 and his
second and third with RCA Records in 2004 and 2006,379
respectively. Like most recording artists, he has seen a steady
increase in the proportion of his music sold on-line relative to hard
album/CD sales.380 Although his voice, lyrics and overall sound is
such a mixture of elements as to be racially ambiguous, Citizen
Cope is white.381
Early on Cope decided to start his own publishing company for
his songs after concluding that his publisher was more like “a
collection agency” and did nothing to promote licensing
opportunities.382 This dissatisfaction mirrored his experience with
record labels, whose services such as A&R, publicity and radio or
press contacts were not as important to his success.383 Citizen
Cope is successful in that he has made enough money to be a fulltime touring and recording musician, but his soulful, danceable yet
376

The following account of Citizen Cope’s views on his music and the music industry
were expressed in an interview with the author. Telephone Interview with Clarence
Greenwood, Citizen Cope (May 21, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Greenwood
Interview]. Citizen Cope may be reached through his website: www.CitizenCope.com.
377
Id.
378
Citizen Cope, Press, http://www.citizencope.com/press/3-Music_:_ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2009).
379
Id.
380
Id.
381
See id.
382
Greenwood Interview, supra note 376.
383
Id.
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thoughtful sound is a closer fit to the amorphous “indie” category
than pop.384 He benefited early on from his relationship with
record companies,385 but now believes that he cannot afford to give
up control and compensation for his work to interests that are now
more “about being bought out and getting market share, signing
acts.”386 In his view, the majors are no longer patient or as skilled
in supporting artists, but “scared and understaffed.”387 Rather than
being artist-driven, he says, conglomeration made it “executivedriven.”388
In deciding to become independent, Citizen Cope has
concluded that he must be both artist and businessperson.389
“Intellectual property is the most powerful thing that America
has,” he explains.390 This is a matter of financial well-being and
more. “People want different things at different times in their
lives.”391 Cope describes elements of ownership that parallel a
personality interest in music authorship: recognition, message,
control, choice and interaction with his audience. “To take your
music where you want it to go, you have to have some control over
those copyrights.”392
However, a large concern looms over his future: What if the
free downloads he, like many others, offer listeners become the
distribution norm, and his personal investments in recording his
work go “unrecouped”?393 Worse, what if consumer-to-artist
384

Id.
Id.
386
Id.
387
Id.
388
Id.
389
Id.
390
Id.
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
For a sample of a contemporary artist views on music downloads, see Jeffrey P.
Fisher, The Lowdown on Downloads, ELECTRONIC MUSICIAN, Dec. 1, 2006, at 76,
available at http://emusician.com/mag/emusic_lowdown_downloads; Marc Hopkins,
Digital Rhythms: Embracing Online Music Distribution, JAZZTIMES, Oct. 2007, available
at
http://www.jazztimes.com/articles/19109-digital-rhythms-embracing-online-musicdistribution; Jonathan Perry, For Musicians, an Online Alternative, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
1, 2006, at F1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/living/articles/2006/
03/01/for_musicians_an_online_alternative; Interview by Chris Burnett with George
Kahn, Pianist and Composer, in Culver City, CA (Mar. 7, 2003), available at
385
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appropriation transcends the idea of infringement in the public’s
mind, and independent artists cannot survive?394 That is, he must
worry not only that he will not gain the sales he requires as an
investor, but that he will lose control, message and the ability to
express himself as an artist should his audience become
parasitic.395
This account of Citizen Cope provides a profile not of all
musical authors today, but of many, including the types for whom
music copyright protection was originally intended—trained
performing composers. In order to exploit his works’ present and
future value and to enforce their use against unauthorized takings,
Citizen Cope would benefit greatly from the status quo in
copyright law, with one major caveat. As he struggles to figure out
the precise form of his independence, he will undoubtedly need to
hire intermediaries on a part-time basis to help him get his CD out.
These will include his lawyer, marketing help, CD manufacturing,
distribution capacity, some publicity assistance and, very
importantly, computer expertise for managing his web presence
and sales. Composer and artist David Byrne described and
evaluated a series of paths music artists can currently take in
digital music.396 Citizen Cope will ultimately choose some
combination of these based on his particular strengths and
inclinations. However, this freedom of choice is a result of recent
changes that continue to shape the life of music artists.397 It
http://www.musicdish.com/mag/print.php3?id=7358; Posting of dorcquek to The Web
Difference, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/webdifference/2008/02/12/class-6-liveblog-inconversation-with-brad-turcotte (Feb. 12, 2008, 15:26 EST); Zed Shaw, Can a Musician
Sell Their Music Online? (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.zedshaw.com/blog/2009-02-262.html.
394
Greenwood Interview, supra note 376.
395
As Citizen Cope himself put it rather humorously, “If I do a show in Tulsa,
Oklahoma to 17,000 people and they all know the words to the song, I don’t know if they
all bought the single.” Id.
396
See Byrne, supra note 373 (describing, inter alia, the “licensing deal,” the
“manufacturing and distribution deal,” and the “self-distribution deal”).
397
For a somewhat different view of what the average musician wants, see KUSEK &
LEONHARD, supra note 358, at 52–53, who write:
Big Music has it backwards: people make music because they are
emotionally and creatively driven to do so . . . not because they are
looking at potential profits or to protect some rights they may have. . .
. If an artist has a message, if someone is really moved by him or
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reflects more than the desire to be paid fairly for one’s creative
works; it also recognizes that independence (or a certain amount of
entrepreneurism) is the best available means to protect one’s
personality interests in selfhood. Therefore, at a practical level, as
long as artists like Citizen Cope are not contractually beholden to
intermediaries that own the work they author or/and perform, and
as long as they have access to the wherewithal to do a modicum of
self-production, the legal status quo may satisfy their primary
career goals as artists. At a theoretical level, they are in a position
to enjoy the originally intended benefits of copyright law in
fulfilling both their utilitarian and personality interests.
This conclusion presents a paradox in which we might end
where we began with copyright law. My analysis is not as
thorough or as knowledgeable as the reformers I will summarize
next, but we will analyze the thrust of their proposals against
Citizen Cope’s statements and the re-assertion of the status quo.
The normative issue might be phrased as follows: Is the musician’s
interest better served by any of the following copyright reform
proposals, or have we reached the optimal environment for
musicians now that most may soon replace corporate “authors”?
C. Reform Proposals
Several important assumptions underlie the digital copyright
reform proposals. First, most assume that the public interest—in
the primary shape of the consumer interest—is paramount.398
Second, they assume that composers and artists deserve fair
compensation.399
Third, record labels and other large
intermediaries probably deserve their precarious fate.400 Most
seem to assume that musicians have not and will not in the future

398

her, if something really unique happens when the artist performs, and
if that performance touches people’s lives, it will have rewards for the
artist.
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961,

965.
399

See Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 960
(2007) (“It is time for lawmakers to conceive of copyright law not as a means of granting
property rights, but as a means of using property rights to promote fair competition in the
marketplace of expression.”).
400
See, e.g., MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 246.
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earn a majority of their income from the exploitation of
copyrighted works, but rather from performing or promoting one’s
fame or both.401 The economic incentives argument, though
central to the construction of copyright, is therefore never a serious
challenge because it is rarely a significant factor.402 Finally, they
all assume that consumer downloads can be effectively captured
for tracking and compensation purposes beyond attempts to evade
detection.403 The proposals then divide broadly into those that
radically alter or overhaul current copyright rules and those that
modify yet complement existing law.
1. Those That Radically Alter/Overhaul Current Copyright
Rules
Raymond Ku sees little continued need for music copyright
law on the Internet because the public now internalizes the costs of
distribution through the purchase and use of music download
devices, and artists generally find compensation in other ways,
such as merchandising and performance.404 Instead, he proposes a
“Digital Recording Act.”405 In lieu of copyright, the act would
fund musicians and songwriters through statutory levies on
consumer equipment such as computers and audio electronics.406
Funds could be allocated based upon the popularity of works by
monitoring downloads and other indicia of a musician’s popularity
on the Internet.407
401

See Ku, supra note 6, at 309–10 (“As George Lucas demonstrated to the motion
picture industry, for the artist, these secondary markets can be more lucrative than the
right to reproduce and distribute content.”).
402
See id.
403
See, e.g., id. at 314 (“[B]illboard.com maintains listings of the top downloads at
various websites. Napster, AOL, and other networks could build similar tracking systems
of their own. By tracking what music is being listened to, the funds from the statutory
levy could be disbursed based upon consumer preference, whether defined by the
percentage of downloads, number of downloads, percentage of use, or any number of
formulas.”).
404
See id. at 300.
405
Id. at 269.
406
See id. at 312–15.
407
See id. Neil Netanel has made similar proposals where the levy would be on the sale
of any product or service whose value is enhanced by P2P file-sharing. See Neil W.
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 53–55 (2003). Canada, France and Germany already impose a
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William Fisher’s proposed changes would also effect a drastic
overhaul of existing rights under copyright law by devising a
system of works registered with the Copyright Office for
payment.408 These works would receive a unique filename by
which their digital transmissions could be tracked for frequency of
use.409 Copyright registrants would be paid a share of taxes levied
by the government proportional to their relative popularity;410 this
division would follow the principle of “consumer sovereignty.”411
Music and films would thereafter be free, and most restrictions on
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and performance would be
eliminated.412 According to Fisher,
the new system would leave in place the current
legal standards for determining who is the author of
a creative work—just as it would the current system
of contracts and customs by which “authors”
compensate other people and organizations who
participate in the creation or marketing of
entertainment products.413
Proponents of these types of proposals point out the not
insignificant social benefit of dramatically reducing the costs of
copyright enforcement.414
From Citizen Cope’s point of view, there is nothing
particularly objectionable about plans from which he can expect to
be paid, assuming tracking and capture is possible. These
proposals establish efficient mechanisms for compensation that
relieve him of the administrative costs. They may amount to a

version of such levies. See generally Jeremy F. deBeer, The Role of Levies in Canada’s
Digital Music Marketplace, 4 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2005); P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ,
LUCIE GUIBAULT & SJOERD VAN GEFFEN, INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW, THE FUTURE
LEVIES
IN
A
DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT
(2003),
http://www.ivir.nl/
OF
publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf (examining existing levy systems in the
European Union).
408
FISHER, supra note 365, at 202.
409
Id.
410
Id.
411
Id. at 223.
412
See id. at 202.
413
Id. at 204–05.
414
See, e.g., id. at 246.
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greater financial reward than the current system, possibly less. We
just cannot know. The administrative problem may be greater than
stated. Even after Napster and its progeny, there exist a plethora of
means for the public to receive free, unauthorized music
downloads, including traditional file server-based sharing, internetrelay-client (“IRC”),415 Usenet,416 P2P file-sharing417 and
BitTorrent.418
This is Cope’s looming fear of digital
independence.419 Once consumers figure out how to go around the
system of capture, his share of financial rewards shrinks. Further,
if copyright rights are substantially reduced, as Ku suggests, Cope
is without the chief legal means to prevent other kinds of
appropriations of his work.420 That loss of enforcement control
415

Internet-relay-client (“IRC”) is a server-based chatroom system developed in the
mid-1980s. See ICRC Help Archive, http://irchelp.org/irchelp/altircfaq.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009). It requires the download of a client to access a server, such server
containing several chatrooms that an individual can enter. Id. Connections to servers, as
well as entry to chatrooms, may often require password authentication. Id. Upon entry to
a chatroom, automated listings are posted in the chatroom identifying file downloads.
See, e.g., Efnet IRC Network, http://efnet.us (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
416
Usenet is a decentralized group of servers across the world that mirror newsgroup
postings on their individual servers. See mIRC, http://www.mirc.com (last visited Oct.
21, 2009).
417
Peer-to-peer file-sharing is a phrase encompassing several different methods of filesharing. See Wikipedia, Peer-to-Peer, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009). Although the method has evolved considerably since its initial
development in the mid-1990s, the essential structure remains the same: (1) a client
indexes all available files on a user’s computer according to file name and other metatag
information; (2) the client connects to a centralized server; (3) and the server receives the
user’s list of files and indexes them accordingly. See id. Thereafter, a connected user
may use the client to search the central server for files, which can be downloaded from
some other user. Id. Newer variants, such as Direct Connect, eliminate the user
registration step, and the only information exposed (other than a user’s files), is an IP
address, which is generally retained by the central server. See Wikipedia, Direct Connect
(File-Sharing), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Connect_(file_sharing) (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009).
418
BitTorrent is a decentralized file-distribution method in which participating users
send and receive small bits of a file from each other. See BitTorrent, http://www.
bittorrent.com/btusers/help (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
Torrents involve two
fundamental concepts—swarming and tracking. A swarm is simply a group of users who
wish to receive and send a certain file. Id. What BitTorrent provides is a method by
which such users are matched up (i.e., tracking). See, e.g., Isohunt, http://www.isohunt.
com (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
419
See Greenwood Interview, supra note 376.
420
See Ku, supra note 6, at 322–23.
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may become a loss of creative control and distinct harm to his
personality interests as an author. From an authorial perspective,
that may seem like too high a price to pay.
2. Those That Complement or Modify the Current Copyright
Rules
With the goal of greater P2P “shareability” and an interest in
paying composers and musicians directly, Jessica Litman proposes
a licensing system for file-sharing that is both statutory and
voluntary.421 Statutory in that “the copyright law would prescribe
the terms and conditions of the license;”422 voluntary in that “the
law would provide an opportunity to designate works as ineligible
for the blanket license.”423 Critical to the proposal is an opt-out
provision, which imposes a heavy burden on authors who wish to
remain outside the blanket license.424 Thus, paid and free music,
old copyright and new, would exist side by side in a royalty system
administered by a government agency.425
Finally, Larry Lessig has argued persistently for a number of
significant changes to the current rules while retaining much of the
existing structure.426 Like Litman, he would mark files to
distinguish whether they are free or not.427 Lessig would also
increase the formal requirements for copyright ownership in order
to make it more burdensome, including registration and renewal,
though he would streamline these requirements by co-opting
private registrars.428 As to the duration of copyright ownership,
Lessig would return it to the pre-1976 average term of 32.2 years,
with an even shorter period for derivative rights.429 Additionally,
Lessig offers a host of changes aimed specifically at the different
kinds of file-sharing uses. For instance, Lessig would provide
421

Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 41 (2004).
Id.
423
Id.
424
See id. at 45.
425
See id.
426
See LESSIG, supra note 348, at 287 (outlining the five types of changes Lessig would
make to the existing structure).
427
See id. at 290–91.
428
Id. at 288–89.
429
See id. at 292–93.
422
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blanket immunity to file-sharing of non-copyrighted works and
those as to which the copyright owner plainly endorses.430 As to
file-sharing of content that remains under copyright, but is not
readily available without undue burden, Lessig would disclaim
liability for non-commercial users and impose a flat fee on
commercial users.431 Finally, as to those using file-sharing
services as substitutes for CD purchases, Lessig would impose a
tax, similar in effect to Fisher’s proposal, to compensate artists to
the extent they can establish harm from file-sharing.432
From Cope’s vantage point, plans that complement existing
law are probably more attractive than those that overhaul it. They
are certainly more likely to overcome the political jockeying that
accompanies reform, though Litman herself is doubtful that major
reform is likely soon.433 She also acknowledges that the problem
with P2P, for all its excitement, is that creators are not being
adequately paid from it.434 In order to avoid that, plans like hers
would rely on the same administrative build-ins for creator
confidence that the earlier proposals hope to institutionalize.435 In
that regard, it suffers from similar assumptions about effective
tracking and capture.
Ironically, the de facto presumption of “shareability” is less
obvious in Lessig’s proposal, which makes it more author-friendly
(in a beneficial sense if, again, we assume the diminishing role of
the record labels). In particular, Lessig’s proposal trains the
primary interest slightly more on the public domain than on the
consumer (free file-sharing) interest.436 Shorter terms, more
formalities, limited derivative rights all enhance the public domain
(an artist-friendly interest as well) without sacrificing robust rights
for current copyright holders who can manage the details. Indeed,
the tax on file-sharing’s market substituting effects speaks directly
430

Id. at 303.
See id.
432
Id.
433
Litman, supra note 421, at 38.
434
Id. at 31.
435
See id. at 38; see also Ku, supra note 6, at 310.
436
See LESSIG, supra note 348, at 296 (“The aim of copyright, with respect to content in
general and music in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
performed, and, most importantly, spread.”).
431
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to the economic anxieties artists may see underlying the other
proposals.437
Yet none of the extant proposals directly addresses the musical
author’s personality interest, which requires utilitarian reward (the
economic interest) and long-term protections for control of
message, form of expression and freedom from distortion—
especially as technological change continues to alter the music
landscape. Regimes that primarily ensure artist compensation on
the way to flexible consumer use may miss that. They risk being
little more than what Professor Long calls “cash ‘n carry”
schemes.438 At a very practical level, the failure to adequately
marry the economic with the personality is reflected in the terms
and agency of a license. If the artist controls permission over
either the public’s use or another artist’s use of her music, she is
exercising some semblance of ownership over her authorship.439 If
authorship is governed instead by blanket or compulsory licenses
(or worse, no license at all after initial usage fees have been paid),
control is lacking and personality is probably at risk.440 Even post
hoc control in the form of moral rights is lacking from the reform
proposals, which again exposes dignity and author identity to risks.
Citizen Cope may rather not wonder what his music is being used
for in the world—even if he can expect some payment for it. The
interest in social exchange about which many reform proponents
write could also be advanced by the transaction costs associated
with seeking out an artist’s permission.
I had not expected to reach this conclusion at the outset of this
project, but the evidence of systematic exploitation and
appropriation of music authorship fairly compels it from an artist’s
perspective. Of course, that perspective is not the only relevant
interest in music copyright law, merely the one most often
subordinated. There are also many legitimate concerns about
437

See id.
See Long, supra note 59, at 1163–64.
439
Professor Long discusses the close, personal relationship an artist has to his/her
work. Long argues that the lack of authorial control can lead to a disincentive to create
new works. See id. at 1192–93.
440
See id. at 1193 (“Given the personal nature of many creative acts, any diminution in
authorial control must be carefully circumscribed and must include recognition of the
personality rights of the artist to assure that creation is not discouraged.”).
438
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overprotection at the expense of the public domain. Some of these
may be answered by the condition precedent I assume—that artist
authorship independent of record label ownership will soon be the
norm—but not entirely. The proposal to both limit the duration
and scope of prohibited derivative uses goes far in curbing the
excesses of cultural proprietorship.441
A greater judicial
commitment to expanding fair uses would be another important
step in this direction. But if we take seriously the natural rights
aspects of copyright’s origins, then we should be willing to
acknowledge the continuing importance of artists’ personality
interests in their work and to protect them from being dismissed by
exclusively economic priorities.
CONCLUSION
The status quo could be made even better by a more explicit
marriage of justificatory interests, personality and utility, as I have
argued. The historical analysis of American music and black
musicians in particular demonstrates that the distributors’ interest
has benefited much more from an economic justification for
copyright protection than actual authors. That is not an argument
against the copyright owner’s economic interest, but rather a
general suspicion of ownership by non-authors. Author and
performer-only musicians were systematically denied the financial
rewards for their work (before and after the 1976 Act) by the
measure of the growth of industry intermediaries who in effect
employed them.442 The most basic tenets of natural law are
frustrated by a legal regime that facilitated so much theft, adhesion
bargaining, and exploitation by necessary but often predatory
intermediaries. I have argued, therefore, that the economic
calculus must be reformulated—as it can be through digital
441

See LESSIG, supra note 348, at 295 (specifically advocating for such changes as part
of his overall reform proposal); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Unbundling Value in
Electronic Information Products: Intellectual Property Protection for Machine Readable
Interfaces, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 415, 480–86 (1994) (“[D]isaggregation
encourages the preparation of a wide variety of compilations or derivative works which,
by definition, include new value, by diminishing the scope of the original author’s
protection.”).
442
See, e.g., supra note 305 and accompanying text.
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music—and the utilitarian interest re-examined to focus again on
its nominal intended beneficiary: the author.
To do so the personality interest must be elevated. This is
particularly true for aesthetic works, such as music, fiction, and
visual art, where the investment in Hegelian will and personality is
clearly manifest. Recognition today may be somewhat different
than the Hegelian definition, but it is no less important. The
current brick-and-mortar (or “lawyers-and-limos”)443 system made
little provision for injury to personality, and therefore its defense
has been minimal and ineffectual. However, from the artist’s
perspective, it is knowable by its often painful absence, which I
have referred to generally as appropriative harms. Illustrated by a
long and difficult history for black musical authors before and after
the 1976 Act, these harms negatively define the personality
interest. However, the prospects for greater artist independence
through the production and distribution of digital music suggest a
return to copyright’s early author emphasis and an affirmative
definition of her interests in personality. Given that promise, we
must be extremely cautious about limiting those protections just
when they may do the most good.

443

See supra Part I.B.

